Legal Case

ROBERT BATES v. CITY OF CHATTANOOGA

Court

Court of Appeals of Tennessee

Decided

June 4, 2025

Jurisdiction

SA

Practice Areas

Tort Law
Personal Injury
Government Liability
Recreational Use Statutes
Liability Law

Case Summary

06/04/2025 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE April 16, 2025 Session ROBERT BATES, ET AL. v. CITY OF CHATTANOOGA, ET AL. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hamilton County No. 23C159 Kyle E. Hedrick, Judge No. E2024-00857-COA-R3-CV This appeal involves statutory construction. Robert Bates and Laurel Diane Bates (“Mr. Bates” and “Ms. Bates,” “Plaintiffs” collectively) sued the City of Chattanooga, Individually and d/b/a the Brainerd Golf Course (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”), alleging personal injuries, loss of services, and loss of consortium stemming from Mr. Bates’ fall on Defendant’s golf course. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment relying on the Tennessee Recreational Use Statute (“the TRUS”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-101, et seq., which provides immunity to landowners who open their property to recreational use. The Trial Court held that Defendant, the landowner, was immune under the TRUS because Mr. Bates was on Defendant’s property to play golf, and golf is comparable to the non-exclusive list of recreational activities found at Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102. No exception to the TRUS was found to apply. Plaintiffs appeal, arguing that golf is not an activity like those listed at Section 102 of the TRUS. Plaintiffs argue further that the fact Mr. Bates paid to play on Defendant’s golf course means Defendant is not entitled to immunity. We hold, inter alia, that golf is sufficiently comparable to Section 102 enumerated activities, particularly hiking, sightseeing, and target shooting, such that Defendant is entitled to immunity under the TRUS. In addition, the fact that Mr. Bates paid to play on Defendant’s golf course is not dispositive because the TRUS has no applicable consideration exception. We affirm. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed; Case Remanded D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN W. MCCLARTY and KRISTI M. DAVIS, JJ., joined. Richard A. Schulman, Eric J. Oliver, and Louis J. Bernsen, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellants, Robert Bates and Laurel Diane Bates. Andrew S. Trundle, Azarius “Zack” Yanez, Gregory E. Glass, and Christopher McKnight, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellee, the City of Chattanooga, Individually and d/b/a the Brainerd Golf Course. OPINION Background On September 23, 2022, Mr. Bates was a paying patron at Brainerd Golf Course, a golf course owned by the City of Chattanooga. While patronizing the golf course, Mr. Bates fell down some steps. In January 2023, Plaintiffs sued Defendant in the Trial Court. Plaintiffs alleged that Mr. Bates suffered personal injuries because of Defendant’s negligence in upkeep and maintenance of the course. Plaintiffs also alleged loss of services and loss of consortium with respect to Ms. Bates. Defendant filed an answer in opposition asserting the TRUS, Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-101, et seq. “The TRUS provides an affirmative defense to a landowner when a person is injured while engaging in a recreational activity on the landowner’s property.” Beckham v. City of Waynesboro, No. M2023-00654-COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL 2153536, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2024), perm. app. denied Sept. 12, 2024. In April 2024, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, again arguing it was entitled to immunity under the TRUS. Defendant cited Section 102 of the TRUS, which provides as relevant: (a) The landowner, lessee, occupant, or any person in control of land or premises owes no duty of care to keep such land or premises safe for entry or use by others for such recreational activities as hunting, fishing, trapping, camping, water sports, white water rafting, canoeing, hiking, sightseeing, animal riding, bird watching, dog training, boating, caving, fruit and vegetable picking for the participant’s own use, nature and historical studies and research, rock climbing, skeet and trap shooting, sporting clays, shooting sports, and target shooting, including archery and shooting range activities, skiing, off-road vehicle riding, and cutting or removing wood for the participant’s own use, nor shall such landowner be required to give any warning of hazardous conditions, uses of, structures, or activities on such land or premises to any person entering on such land or premises for such purposes, except as provided in § 70-7-104. Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102(a) (West eff. April 6, 2015). Golf is not a listed activity. Nevertheless, it was and remains Defendant’s position that golf is comparable to the non- exclusive list of activities contain

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Case Details

Case Details

Legal case information

Status

Decided

Date Decided

June 4, 2025

Jurisdiction

SA

Court Type

federal

Legal Significance

Case importance metrics

Citations
22
Legal Topics
Tennessee Recreational Use Statute
Immunity
Negligence
Recreational Activities
+2 more

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Additional information

AddedJun 4, 2025
UpdatedJun 4, 2025

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Case Summary

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Legal Topics

Areas of law covered in this case

Tennessee Recreational Use Statute
Immunity
Negligence
Recreational Activities
Landowner Liability
Golf Liability

Case Information

Detailed case metadata and classifications

Court Proceedings

Date FiledJune 4, 2025
Date DecidedJune 4, 2025

Document Details

Times Cited
22

Legal Classification

JurisdictionSA
Court Type
federal
Judicial Panel
Chief Judge D. Michael Swiney
Opinion Author
Chief Judge D. Michael Swiney

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