Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litigation (No. Ii)- Mdl No. 2925

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 GAMALIEL ELIZALDE, Case No. 25-cv-02683-WHO (PR) Plaintiff, 8 ORDER OF DISMISSAL v. 9 10 CONTRA COSTA ADULT SCHOOL PROGRAM, et al., 11 Defendants. 12 13 INTRODUCTION 14 Plaintiff Gamaliel Elizalde alleges that an adult school teacher deprived him of 15 academic credits he had earned, thereby adversely affecting his parole suitability in which 16 he has a protected due process interest. His 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint containing these 17 allegations is now before me for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 18 This federal civil rights action is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim for relief. 19 Even if there were a cause of action for unlawful interference with parole suitability, no 20 claim would lie on the facts presented here. Elizalde admits that the deprived credits were 21 restored. Also, a claim that the teacher interfered with his liberty interest in parole is too 22 speculative. He is not eligible for parole until 2028 or 2029 and parole decisions are based 23 on many factors, with the completion of school courses being only one such factor. 24 DISCUSSION 25 A. Standard of Review 26 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a 27 prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 1 cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim 2 upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 3 from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. 4 See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 5 A “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 6 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 7 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial 8 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 9 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting 10 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Furthermore, a court “is not required to accept legal 11 conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably 12 be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754–55 13 (9th Cir. 1994). 14 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 15 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 16 violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 17 color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 18 B. Legal Claims 19 Elizalde alleges that in 2023 he took classes at the Martinez Detention Facility with 20 Eve, a teacher employed by the Contra Costa Adult School Program, to increase his parole 21 suitability. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1 at 3-4.) He alleges that Eve took away or failed to give 22 him the academic credits he earned through his coursework. (Id. at 9-11.) However, he 23 admits that those same credits were later restored. (Id. at 11-12.) Elizalde states that his 24 next parole eligibility hearing will not be held until 2028 or 2029. (Id. at 3.) 25 Elizalde’s allegations that Eve unlawfully interfered with his due process right to 26 parole fail to state a claim for relief. Even if suc

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KURT HIPP, et al., No. 2:25-cv-01806-DJC-SCR 12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 14 THE CITY OF VALLEJO, 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 Plaintiffs are four unhoused individuals currently living in and around the 19 parking areas in the vicinity of the Vallejo City Hall. Plaintiffs have filed the present 20 action along with an ex parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order in 21 connection with the City’s plan to evict Plaintiffs and others currently residing in this 22 area. Plaintiffs assert that despite their making requests for reasonable 23 accommodations for their disabilities, the City has not provided accommodations, 24 contacted them about their disabilities, or otherwise communicated with them about 25 their requests. Plaintiffs also claim that the City’s actions in evicting them violate the 26 Fourteenth Amendment state-created danger doctrine and due process clause. 27 In their Application for Temporary Restraining Order, Plaintiffs request that the 28 Court order the City to not execute its plan to evict Plaintiffs from their temporary 1 residences. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs’ Application (ECF No. 5) is 2 granted. A hearing on whether a preliminary injunction should issue is set for July 11, 3 2025. 4 BACKGROUND 5 Plaintiffs are four unhoused individuals living in the City of Vallejo. Each Plaintiff 6 lives in or around the parking areas near the Vallejo City Hall, Vallejo Library, and 7 Vallejo Ferry Terminal. (Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 5–6.)1 On May 22, 2025, City of Vallejo 8 Assistant City Manager Natalie Peterson posted a written notice of eviction near 9 Plaintiffs’ residences. (Id. at 7.) The notice informed Plaintiffs and others living in that 10 area that they would be evicted in 5 days’ time. (Id.) Susan Masson, another 11 unhoused resident at this location who is not a party to this action, states that Peterson 12 told Masson and others that “the City of Vallejo was not going to honor any 13 Reasonable Accommodation Requests under the Americans with Disabilities Act, and 14 [Peterson] implied that we should not bother to fill them out.” (Id.; ECF No. 1-2 at 26, 15 ¶ 3.) On May 27, 2025, Plaintiff Kurt Hipp and Plaintiff M.T., through his mother, 16 Plaintiff Corletta Tate2, submitted requests for reasonable accommodations for their 17 disabilities under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. (Compl. at 7.) On that 18 same day, Peterson and another City employee, Flor Magallanes, informed residents 19 that the evictions were temporarily halted to address accommodation requests the 20 City had received. (Id.) 21 During the week of June 12, 2025, Magallanes spoke with Plaintiff Tate and 22 informed her that she and her son would be evicted on June 30, 2025. (Id. at 8.) On 23 June 13, 2025, this eviction date was confirmed when the City posted a notice on its 24 25 1 Plaintiffs have not provided internal pagination for their Complaint and several exhibits are combined within a single file. (See ECF Nos. 1, 1-1, 1-2.) To ensure clarity, for all citations in this Order to 26 documents provided by Plaintiffs the Court utilizes the Bate stamped page numbers. 27 2 Within Plaintiffs’ Application there is a documen

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 JEFFERY WALKER, Case No. 24-cv-08900 EJD (PR) 7 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE DEFICIENT CLAIMS; OF 8 v. SERVICE; DIRECTING DEFENDANTS TO FILE 9 SGT. IBARRA, et al., DISPOSITIVE MOTION OR NOTICE REGARDING SUCH 10 Defendants. MOTION; INSTRUCTIONS TO CLERK 11 (Docket No. 11) 12 Plaintiff, a civil detainee at the San Francisco County Jail (“CJ2”), filed the instant 13 pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against officers and medical staff at 14 CJ2. Dkt. No. 1. On May 14, 2025, the Court screened the complaint and granted leave to 15 amend to correct the deficiencies with respect to various claims. Dkt. No. 8. In the 16 alternative, Plaintiff could file notice that he wished to strike the deficient claims and 17 proceed on the cognizable claims for failure to protect and deficient medical care against 18 Defendants Perez, Collins, Pratt, and Main. Id. at 12. 19 20 On June 12, 2025, Plaintiff filed a request to strike the deficient claims. Dkt. No. 21 11. The request is GRANTED. This action shall proceed on the cognizable claims 22 identified in the Court’s screening order. 23 DISCUSSION 24 A. Standard of Review 25 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a 26 prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 27 governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any 1 upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 2 from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally 3 construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 4 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 5 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 6 violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 7 color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 8 B. Plaintiff’s Claims 9 Below is the Court’s discussion of the cognizable claims in the complaint from the 10 screening order: 11 1. September 2024 Incident 12 Plaintiff claims that in September 2024, he was housed in E-pod where “classification brought back I/M R, a known enemy.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 13, 35- 13 36. At some prior time, Inmate “R” had “popped a bag with urine that got on Plaintiff and his legal work.” Id. ¶ 15. Defendant Captain Collins asked 14 Plaintiff if he wanted to press charges, and Plaintiff declined; Inmate “R” was moved out of E-pod. Id. ¶ 16. “Somehow” in September 2024, Inmate 15 “R” was rehoused back to E-pod, despite defendants admitting to Plaintiff that they could not be safely housed together. Id. ¶ 18. Later that month, 16 Plaintiff claims Defendant Deputy Perez opened the “adseg gate” where Inmate “R” was housed, which allowed Inmate “R” to run through to attack 17 Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 19-21. Although he initially s

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION 6 7 IMPOSSIBLE FOODS INC., Case No. 5:21-cv-02419-BLF 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 9 v. MOTION TO MODIFY THE SCHEDULING ORDER 10 IMPOSSIBLE LLC, et al., [Re: Dkt. No. 228] 11 Defendants. 12 IMPOSSIBLE LLC, et al., 13 Counterclaim-Plaintiffs, 14 v. 15 IMPOSSIBLE FOODS INC., 16 Counterclaim-Defendant. 17 18 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Modify the Scheduling Order. Dkt. No. 228 19 (“Mot.”). Defendant filed an opposition to the motion. Dkt. No. 234 (“Opp.”). Plaintiff filed a 20 reply in support of its motion. Dkt. No. 237 (“Reply”). The Court finds this motion suitable for 21 submission without oral argument and hereby VACATES the hearing scheduled for August 28, 22 2025. See Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). 23 For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion. 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 The Court recites briefly only the background directly relevant to the present motion. 26 Fact discovery in this proceeding closed on April 14, 2025. See Dkt. No. 113 at 4. A few 27 days prior to that deadline, Plaintiff Impossible Foods Inc. (“IF”) took the deposition of Defendant 1 for Defendant Impossible LLC (“ILLC”). See Dkt. No. 228-1, Declaration of H. Forrest 2 Flemming, III (“Flemming Decl.”) ¶ 5. The following day, IF served Defendants with a draft 3 portion of a Joint Discovery Statement seeking in camera review of certain privileged documents 4 under the crime-fraud exception. Id. ¶ 6. Defendants responded with their portion of the Joint 5 Discovery Statement on April 15, and IF promptly filed the statement with the Court. See id. ¶ 7. 6 On May 6, 2025, Magistrate Judge Susan van Keulen denied IF’s request for in camera 7 review. Dkt. No. 208. IF then sought relief from Judge van Keulen’s Order, which the 8 undersigned granted on June 4, 2025. See Dkt. No. 222. Shortly thereafter, Judge van Keulen 9 requested further information about the privileged documents, and the in camera review 10 proceedings remain pending before her. See Dkt. Nos. 224, 233. 11 The deadline for filing the Parties’ summary judgment motions is July 3, 2025. Dkt. No. 12 113 at 4. Plaintiff now moves to modify the scheduling order in order to permit the parties 13 approximately thirty-five extra days to prepare their summary judgment filings. 14 II. LEGAL STANDARD 15 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, a district court’s scheduling order “may be 16 modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). This 17 standard “primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Johnson v. 18 Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). “Although the existence or degree 19 of prejudice to the party opposing the modification might supply additional reasons to deny a 20 motion, the focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification.” Id. 21 A district court “may modify the pretrial schedule ‘if it cannot reasonably be met despite the 22 diligence of the party seeking the extension.’” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee’s 23 notes (1983 amendment), and Harrison Beverage Co. v. Dribeck Importers, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 463, 24 469 (D.N.J. 1990)). 25 III. DISCUSSION 26 IF argues that, in light of the ongoing in camera review of “potentially critical documents,” 27 the Court should modify the scheduling order to prevent the Par

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN JOSE DIVISION 7 8 Case No. 5:23-cv-00343-EJD GREGG BERKELEY, 9 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION 10 v. Re: Dkt. No. 76 11 12 INTEL CORPORATION, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 Plaintiff Gregg Berkeley (“Berkeley”) brings this class action against Defendants Intel 15 Corporation and the Administrative Committee of the Intel Minimum Pension Plan (collectively, 16 “Intel”) alleging violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) 17 and breaches of Intel’s fiduciary duties. Compl., ECF No. 1. Before the Court is Berkeley’s 18 motion for class certification. Mot., ECF No. 76; Opp’n, ECF No. 80; Reply, ECF No. 83. The 19 Court held a hearing on May 1, 2025, and heard oral arguments from all parties. ECF No. 87. For 20 the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS Berkeley’s motion. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 Berkeley and a proposed class of approximately 1,847 Intel retirees or their surviving 23 spouses allege Intel violated ERISA by converting their single life annuity (“SLA”) to a joint and 24 survivor annuity (“JSA”) using unreasonable actuarial assumptions in the Intel Minimum Pension 25 Plan (“MPP”). Mot. 1. 26 The proposed class is defined as follows: 27 All Plan participants and beneficiaries who are receiving a joint and survivor annuity (or, for beneficiaries whose spouses died 1 before commencing benefits, a pre-retirement survivor annuity) which is less than the value of the single life annuity converted to 2 a joint and survivor annuity using the interest rates and mortality tables set forth in 26 U.S.C. § 417(e) with an annual stability and 3 August lookback period. 4 Id. at 10. 5 An SLA is an annuity payable monthly upon retirement for the duration of the participant’s 6 life. MPP § 5(d)(i), ECF No. 76-7. SLAs are the default benefit for unmarried participants. Id. 7 §§ 5(d)(ii)–(iii). A JSA is an annuity payable monthly where different portions of retirees’ 8 monthly payments continue to their surviving spouse or designated beneficiary after their death. 9 Id. Because a JSA provides a stream of payments over the course of two lives, the monthly 10 payment may be adjusted downward. Expert Report of Ian Altman (“Altman Report”) 7–8, ECF 11 No. 86-1. 12 Under ERISA, JSAs for married retirees must be “actuarily e