People of Michigan v. Anthony Lamar Bonner

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED June 24, 2025 Plaintiff-Appellee, 9:28 AM v No. 359850 Ingham Circuit Court ANTHONY LAMAR BONNER, LC No. 17-000577-FC Defendant-Appellant. Before: YATES, P.J., and YOUNG and WALLACE, JJ. YOUNG, J (dissenting). Because I would instead remand this matter for a new trial, I dissent. To begin, I call into question whether Cottrell should have been qualified as an expert in the first instance. As the majority mentioned, there was a pre-trial motion to exclude testimony from Cottrell as an expert for the people. I agree with the majority that at that hearing and again on appeal, defense counsel persuasively highlights the myriad cases in which Cottrell’s testimony has been deemed erroneous or improper. The majority highlights some of those cases. Ante at 10 n 3. Where we part ways is in our viewing of the trial court’s application of MRE 702. There, I think the trial court fell short. MRE 702 states: A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify if the proponent demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than not that: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and -1-  (d) the expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case. It is difficult to identify where, if at all, a track record of providing improper testimony would be considered under these factors. It is likewise difficult to identify where, if at all, the number of times one was previously qualified as an expert would be considered under these factors. But defense counsel’s argument did not focus on Cottrell’s track record alone. In his written pretrial motion, defense counsel argued: a. The alleged expert-witness does not have a doctorate or substantial equivalent degree; b. He does not have a treatment history with the alleged victim; c. He has not published in peer-reviewed publications that would have subjected him to a vigorous vetting process from colleagues in the field. d. He never issued a report in this matter. e. While he may have allegedly attended conferences, there is nothing to indicate that he has any sort of national standing as an expert witness. At the motion hearing, defense counsel noted that Cottrell does not “provide anything for this [c]ourt.” Defense counsel argued that there was no underlying scientific basis for Cottrell’s testimony, only Cottrell’s “own personal bias and opinion.” This directly gets at all aspects of knowledge or skill required by MRE 702. Rather than inquire as to any of these factors, the trial court asked if Cottrell was causing problems in “4 out of 1,000 cases or 900 out of 1,000?” Defense counsel responded that he did not know the exact data but Cottrell was not educating the jury and was instead “biasing” and “vouching.” The court, again rather than address any of the elements of MRE 702, observed that these sort of things “would just be terribly fun cross-examination.” The prosecutor focused their response on the fact that “behavioral testimony” from experts remained admissible in criminal sexual conduct cases. And, this Court has said as much in another case involving Cottrell—in People v Gonzalez-Barcena, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued December 17, 2020 (Docket No. 348429), p 6, this Court said: Behavioral science, and more particularly, the area of child sexual abuse, are both recognized fields of practice. See People v Beckley, 434 Mich 691, 718; 465 NW2d 391 (1990). The purpose of expert testimony such as Cottrell’s is to aid the jury in determining whether a “the behavior of this particular victim is common to the class of reported child abuse victims.” Id. at 726. -2- The prosecutor cited the Gonzalez-Barcena1, Beckley, and cases that followed, and said experts