National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005)
Primary Holding
The Federal Communications Commission's determination that cable companies providing broadband Internet service do not qualify as "telecommunications services" under Title II of the Communications Act, and thus are exempt from mandatory common-carrier regulation, is a lawful construction of the Act under the Chevron deference standard.
In the case of National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services, the Supreme Court decided that cable companies providing broadband Internet are not classified as "telecommunications services." This means they don’t have to follow strict regulations that apply to traditional phone companies. For consumers, this ruling allows cable companies more freedom in how they operate, which can lead to more choices and potentially lower prices for Internet services. This case is relevant when considering how different types of Internet providers are regulated and what options you have for service.
AI-generated plain-language summary to help you understand this case
In the case of National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services, the underlying dispute arose from the classification of broadband Internet service provided by cable companies. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) determined that cable companies offering broadband services did not qualify as "telecommunications services" under Title II of the Communications Act of 1934. This classification exempted them from mandatory common-carrier regulation, which would impose certain regulatory obligations on telecommunications providers. Brand X Internet Services, a company that provided Internet access over cable lines, challenged this FCC ruling, arguing that cable broadband should be classified as a telecommunications service. The procedural history of the case began when Brand X Internet Services contested the FCC's decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of Brand X, stating that the FCC's interpretation was not consistent with the Communications Act. This ruling prompted the National Cable & Telecommunications Association and the FCC to seek review from the Supreme Court, leading to the Court's consideration of the case on writs of certiorari. The relevant background context includes the evolution of Internet access technologies in the United States. Traditionally, consumers accessed the Internet through dial-up connections over local telephone lines, which were limited in speed. The advent of broadband services, particularly cable modem service, allowed for much faster data transmission via cable television networks. This technological shift raised regulatory questions about how different types of Internet service should be classified and regulated under existing telecommunications laws, ultimately leading to the Supreme Court's examination of the FCC's authority to classify broadband services.
Whether the Federal Communications Commission's conclusion that cable companies providing broadband Internet service do not qualify as "telecommunications service" providers under the Communications Act, and thus are exempt from mandatory common-carrier regulation, is a lawful construction of the Act under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and the Administrative Procedure Act.
The judgment is reversed.
- Court
- Supreme Court
- Decision Date
- March 29, 2005
- Jurisdiction
- federal
- Case Type
- landmark
- Damages Awarded
- N/A
- Data Quality
- high
Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005)
Consumer LostAn individual may not enforce the limitations on local zoning authority set forth in §332(c)(7) of the Communications Act of 1934 through an action under 42 U.S.C. §1983.
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Consumer LostThe "substantially advances" formula established in Agins v. City of Tiburon is not an appropriate test for determining whether government regulation effects a taking under the Fifth Amendment.
Mid-Con Freight Systems, Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 440 (2005)
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San Remo Hotel, L. P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005)
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