Md. Dept. of Health v. Boulden
Boulden
Court
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
Decided
June 3, 2025
Jurisdiction
SA
Practice Areas
Case Summary
Maryland Department of Health v. Jeffrey Boulden, et al., Nos. 534, 581, 582, 641, 643, 996 & 1291, September Term, 2024. Opinion by Graeff, J. CONSTRUCTIVE CIVIL CONTEMPT — STATUTORY SANCTIONS Where the court finds an individual to be incompetent to stand trial (“IST”) and dangerous, the Maryland Department of Health (the “Department”) is required, under Md. Code Ann., Criminal Procedure (“CP”) § 3-106(c)(4) (2024 Supp.), to admit the defendant to a designated health facility within ten business days of the commitment order. If the Department does not admit the defendant to a Department facility within that time period, the defendant can seek to compel compliance by filing an action for constructive civil contempt or an action for statutory sanctions under CP § 3-106(c)(4). Constructive civil contempt requires a finding, based on evidence, of a willful failure to comply with the court’s commitment order. In the Dorchester County case, the only evidence presented in support of the contempt petition was that the Department had taken action to alleviate the bed shortage in its facilities, but there were still not enough beds to comply with the court’s commitment order. Without evidence that the Department could have done more to comply with the order, the mens rea element of constructive civil contempt, i.e., willfulness, is not satisfied. Because the record does not support the finding that the Department willfully failed to comply with the Dorchester County commitment order, the court’s finding in this regard was clearly erroneous, and it abused its discretion in holding the Department in contempt. In addition to a contempt finding, a court can impose sanctions on the Department pursuant to CP § 3-106. To find a violation of CP § 3-106(c)(2), the court needs to determine only that the Department failed to admit the defendant to a designated health facility within the statutorily required ten-day period. Evidence that the Department could not comply with commitment orders due to the unavailability of beds does not categorically preclude sanctions under CP § 3-106(c)(4). If the court finds a failure to timely admit a defendant, the statute provides for the imposition of sanctions “reasonably designed to compel compliance.” Although the statute does not define the term “reasonably designed to compel compliance,” the legislative history makes clear that the intent of the General Assembly in enacting CP § 3-106(c)(4) was to impose a deadline for admission, with sanctions to enforce compliance. Given the increasing problem of a failure to timely admit defendants, it was reasonable for the courts to believe that large statutory sanctions would encourage the Department to explore all options to resolve this continued problem. That two of the defendants, Glenn D. Hawkins and Kennard Jacobi Goins, had been admitted to a Department facility prior to the sanctions hearing did not prohibit the court from imposing sanctions under CP § 3-106(c)(4). The statute does not contain any language stating that reimbursement or other sanctions cannot be imposed once the patient has been admitted to a Department facility. Construing the statute to limit sanctions, including reimbursement to detention centers, when the Department has already admitted a defendant to a facility prior to the sanctions hearing would add words to the statute and frustrate the legislature’s express intent to allow for reimbursement to the detention center for costs incurred in housing defendants that should be in a Department facility. In the Kent County case involving Jeffrey Boulden, and in the Baltimore County cases involving William Damond Lomax, Malik T. Jackson, Mr. Goins, Mr. Hawkins, and Steven R. Kauffman, the court did not abuse its discretion in its decision to impose sanctions. With respect to the amount of sanctions, however, we construe the statute to authorize the calculation of daily sanctions beginning on the 11th business day from the date of the commitment order. In the Baltimore County cases involving Mr. Lomax, Mr. Jackson, Mr. Goins, and Mr. Hawkins, the court did not calculate the daily sanctions beginning on the 11th business day. We reverse those orders and remand for a new calculation regarding the amount of sanctions. Circuit Court for Kent County Case Nos. C-14-CR-21-000044, C-14-CR-23-000050, C-14- CR-23-000146 Circuit Court for Baltimore County Case Nos. C-03-CR-24-000015, C-03-CR-24-000251 C-03-CR-23-002969, C-03-CR-23-003449 C-03-CR-23-003775 Circuit Court for Dorchester County Case No. C-09-CR-23-000286 REPORTED IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND Nos. 534, 581, 582, 641, 643, 996, 1291 September Term, 2
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Maryland Department of Health v. Jeffrey Boulden, et al., Nos. 534, 581, 582, 641, 643, 996 & 1291, September Term, 2024. Opinion by Graeff, J.
CONSTRUCTIVE CIVIL CONTEMPT — STATUTORY SANCTIONS
Where the court finds an individual to be incompetent to stand trial (“IST”) and dangerous, the Maryland Department of Health (the “Department”) is required, under Md. Code Ann., Criminal Procedure (“CP”) § 3-106(c)(4) (2024 Supp.), to admit the defendant to a designated health facility within ten business days of the commitment order. If the Department does not admit the defendant to a Department facility within that time period, the defendant can seek to compel compliance by filing an action for constructive civil contempt or an action for statutory sanctions under CP § 3-106(c)(4).
Constructive civil contempt requires a finding, based on evidence, of a willful failure to comply with the court’s commitment order. In the Dorchester County case, the only evidence presented in support of the contempt petition was that the Department had taken action to alleviate the bed shortage in its facilities, but there were still not enough beds to comply with the court’s commitment order. Without evidence that the Department could have done more to comply with the order, the mens rea element of constructive civil contempt, i.e., willfulness, is not satisfied. Because the record does not support the finding that the Department willfully failed to comply with the Dorchester County commitment order, the court’s finding in this regard was clearly erroneous, and it abused its discretion in holding the Department in contempt.
In addition to a contempt finding, a court can impose sanctions on the Department pursuant to CP § 3-106. To find a violation of CP § 3-106(c)(2), the court needs to determine only that the Department failed to admit the defendant to a designated health facility within the statutorily required ten-day period. Evidence that the Department could not comply with commitment orders due to the unavailability of beds does not categorically preclude sanctions under CP § 3-106(c)(4). If the court finds a failure to timely admit a defendant, the statute provides for the imposition of sanctions “reasonably designed to compel compliance.”
Although the statute does not define the term “reasonably designed to compel compliance,” the legislative history makes clear that the intent of the General Assembly in enacting CP § 3-106(c)(4) was to impose a deadline for admission, with sanctions to enforce compliance. Given the increasing problem of a failure to timely admit defendants, it was reasonable for the courts to believe that large statutory sanctions would encourage the Department to explore all options to resolve this continued problem.
That two of the defendants, Glenn D. Hawkins and Kennard Jacobi Goins, had been admitted to a Department facility prior to the sanctions hearing did not prohibit the court from imposing sanctions under CP § 3-106(c)(4). The statute does not contain any language stating that reimbursement or other sanctions cannot be imposed once the patient has been admitted to a Department facility. Construing the statute to limit sanctions, including reimbursement to detention centers, when the Department has already admitted a defendant to a facility prior to the sanctions hearing would add words to the statute and frustrate the legislature’s express intent to allow for reimbursement to the detention center for costs incurred in housing defendants that should be in a Department facility.
In the Kent County case involving Jeffrey Boulden, and in the Baltimore County cases involving William Damond Lomax, Malik T. Jackson, Mr. Goins, Mr. Hawkins, and Steven R. Kauffman, the court did not abuse its discretion in its decision to impose sanctions. With respect to the amount of sanctions, however, we construe the statute to authorize the calculation of daily sanctions beginning on the 11th business day from the date of the commitment order. In the Baltimore County cases involving Mr. Lomax, Mr. Jackson, Mr. Goins, and Mr. Hawkins, the court did not calculate the daily sanctions beginning on the 11th business day. We reverse those orders and remand for a new calculation regarding the amount of sanctions. Circuit Court for Kent County Case Nos. C-14-CR-21-000044, C-14-CR-23-000050, C-14- CR-23-000146
Circuit Court for Baltimore County Case Nos. C-03-CR-24-000015, C-03-CR-24-000251 C-03-CR-23-002969, C-03-CR-23-003449 C-03-CR-23-003775
Circuit Court for Dorchester County Case No. C-09-CR-23-000286
REPORTED
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND
Nos. 534, 581, 582, 641, 643, 996, 1291
September Term, 2
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June 3, 2025
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