Johnson Mobile Park, Inc. v. Schoffstall

264 June 11, 2025 No. 530 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON JOHNSON MOBILE PARK, INC., dba Johnson Mobile Estates, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Tara SCHOFFSTALL and all others, Defendant-Appellant. Clackamas County Circuit Court 24LT05395; A184089 Ulanda L. Watkins, Judge. Argued and submitted April 10, 2025. Ann Berryhill Witte argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant. Mark L. Busch argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent. Before Lagesen, Chief Judge, O’Connor, Judge, and Kistler, Senior Judge. O’CONNOR, J. Reversed. Cite as 341 Or App 264 (2025) 265 O’CONNOR, J. In this forcible entry and detainer (FED) proceed- ing, defendant (tenant) appeals a judgment awarding res- titution of the premises to plaintiff, Johnson Mobile Park, Inc. (landlord). Tenant raises two assignments of error. Because it is dispositive, we write only to address tenant’s first assignment, in which she contends that the trial court erred by denying her motion to dismiss the FED complaint. Specifically, tenant argues that the notice terminating her tenancy was invalid because it ambiguously described the date on which her tenancy terminated in violation of ORS 90.632 and ORS 90.160(1).1 We agree that the termination notice was ambiguous and, therefore, invalid. The trial court erred by denying tenant’s motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we reverse. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The relevant facts are undisputed. In 2010, tenant purchased a manufactured home and began renting a space in a mobile home park owned by landlord. In February 2023, park managers inspected tenant’s home and identi- fied various areas in need of repair. On March 28, 2023, landlord mailed tenant a notice terminating her tenancy under ORS 90.6322 due to the disrepair and deterioration of the exterior of her manufactured home. The notice provided that her tenancy would terminate “at 12:00 midnight (end of day) on May 31, 2023 (‘correction deadline’)” unless tenant completed 15 repairs listed in the notice. 1 ORS 90.160(1) has been amended since landlord issued the termination notice at issue in this case. We refer to the current version of the statute in this opinion because the amendments do not affect our analysis. 2 ORS 90.632 provides, in part: “(1) A landlord may terminate a month-to-month or fixed term rental agreement and require the tenant to remove a manufactured dwelling or floating home from a facility, due to the physical condition of the exterior of the manufactured dwelling or floating home, only by complying with this section and ORS 105.100 to 105.168. A termination shall include removal of the dwelling or home. “* * * * * “(3) * * * [I]f the exterior of the tenant’s dwelling or home is in disrepair or is deteriorated, a landlord may terminate a rental agreement and require the removal of a dwelling or home by giving to the tenant not less than 60 days’ written notice before the date designated in the notice for termination.” 266 Johnson Mobile Park, Inc. v. Schoffstall On June 13, 2023, landlord mailed tenant a notice extending the correction deadline by 60 days to July 31, 2023. On November 10, 2023, landlord mailed tenant a notice extending the correction deadline by six months. The final notice provided that “the new deadline for you to complete the repairs listed in the 60-day notice will be extended to 12:00 midnight (end of day) on January 31, 2024.” In March 2024, landlord filed a residential eviction complaint, asserting that landlord was entitled to posses- sion of the property after the expiration of a 60-day notice issued under ORS 90.632. Tenant’s answer alleged that landlord’s notice was defective under ORS 90.160(1) and ORS 90.632, denied that the notice stated good cause for termination, and denied that the violations were not timely cured. The case proceeded to trial. At the close of tenant’s case, she moved to dismiss, arguing that the notices issued by landlord were ambiguous and, therefore, invalid because they identified “midnight (end of day)” as the time of termi- nation. In tenant’s view, the reference to “midnight” in the notice created ambiguity as to whether the tenancy ended on May 31st or June 1st. Tenant argued that the legislature sought to avoid that ambiguity by enacting ORS 90.160(1), which provides that notice periods “must be calculated by consecutive calendar days, not including the initial day of service, but including the last day until 11:59 p.m.” Landlord responded that ORS 90.160(1) merely prescribed the method of calculating the time at