In the Interest of A.R.G., a Child v. the State of Texas

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas 10-25-00041-CV In the Interest of A.R.G., a Child On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 of Ellis County, Texas Judge James S. Chapman, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 112195CCL CHIEF JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court. MEMORANDUM OPINION Following a bench trial, the parental rights of A.R.G.’s mother (Mother) were terminated. 1 The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had violated Family Code subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), and (P) and that termination was in the child’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b). In her sole issue, Mother contends that the trial court 1 The parental rights of A.R.G.’s father were also terminated, but he has not appealed. abused its discretion by terminating her parental rights because the evidence does not support termination. 2 We will affirm. The standards of review for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence in cases involving the termination of parental rights are well established and will not be repeated here. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264–68 (Tex. 2002) (legal sufficiency); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002) (factual sufficiency). The trial court, as factfinder, is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009). In a proceeding to terminate the parent-child relationship brought under section 161.001 of the Family Code, the Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) must establish by clear and convincing evidence two elements: (1) that the respondent parent committed one or more acts or omissions enumerated under subsection (b)(1), termed a predicate violation, and (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b); In re J.F.-G., 612 S.W.3d 373, 381 (Tex. App.—Waco 2020) (mem. op.), aff’d, 627 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. 2021). Proof of one element does not 2 Mother does not specify whether her challenge is directed toward the legal sufficiency of the evidence, the factual sufficiency of the evidence, or both. Mother references the applicable standard of review for only legal sufficiency; however, in one section of the brief, she asserts more than once that the “evidence is legally and factually insufficient.” The brief’s prayer requests that we “reverse the trial court’s ruling and grant any other or further relief to which [Mother] is entitled, including remand to the trial court to return the child to the Mother.” As for the Department, it has treated Mother’s issue as a challenge to both the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence. Construing Mother’s brief liberally, we will also treat Mother’s issue as a challenge to both the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence. See, e.g., Okonkwo v. VE Westchase LLC, No. 14-19-00935-CV, 2020 WL 7038401, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 1., 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). In the Interest of A.R.G., a Child Page 2 relieve the petitioner of the burden of proving the other. J.F.-G., 612 S.W.3d at 381. PREDICATE VIOLATIONS Mother first contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s findings that she violated Family Code subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), and (P). We begin with Mother’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that she violated subsection (E). Termination under subsection (E) requires clear and convincing evidence that the parent has “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). To “endanger” means to expose the child to loss or injury, to jeopardize. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987). The relevant inquiry under subsection (E) is whether sufficient evidence exists that the endangerment of the child’s well-being was the direct result of the parent’s conduct, including acts, omissions, or failures to act. In re E.M., 494 S.W.3d 209, 222 (Tex. App.—Waco 2015, pet. denied). Scienter is not required for a parent’s own acts to constitute endangerment under subsection (E). See In re L.S., No. 10-22-00119-CV, 2022 WL 3655395, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 24, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). It is In the Interest of A.R.G., a Child Page 3 also not necessary to show that the parent’s conduct was directed at the child or that the child suffered actual inj