In Re the Marriage of Duvall

IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION TWO IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF BRADLY P. DUVALL, Appellant, and JANET M. DUVALL, NOW KNOWN AS JANET M. TUCHOLSKI, Appellee. No. 2 CA-CV 2024-0095-FC Filed June 19, 2025 Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. FC2015002770 The Honorable Monica Edelstein, Judge AFFIRMED COUNSEL Stevens & Van Cott PLLC, Scottsdale By Charles Van Cott and Laurence B. Stevens Counsel for Appellant M. Wayne Lewis, Chandler Counsel for Appellee  IN RE MARRIAGE OF DUVALL Opinion of the Court OPINION Judge Gard authored the opinion of the Court, in which Presiding Judge O’Neil and Judge Brearcliffe concurred. G A R D, Judge: ¶1 In this post-marital dissolution proceeding, Bradly Duvall (“Husband”) appeals from the superior court’s order denying his petition to enforce a provision in the dissolution decree ordering him and Janet Tucholski (“Wife”) to each pay one-half of Husband’s student loan balance as a community debt. Because the court correctly determined that the enforcement petition was time-barred under A.R.S. § 25-318(P), we affirm. Factual and Procedural Background ¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the superior court’s findings and orders. Leathers v. Leathers, 216 Ariz. 374, ¶ 20 (App. 2007); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 152 Ariz. 317, 323 (1987). In 1992, Husband obtained a student loan to attend law school. Husband and Wife married the following year. During the marriage, the parties made payments toward the student loan balance using community funds. In September 1999, the lender sent Husband a disclosure statement indicating that the loan’s final payment would be due in December 2021.1 ¶3 In February 2015, Husband served Wife with a petition for dissolution, terminating the marital community. See A.R.S. § 25-211(A)(2). In the subsequent dissolution decree, the superior court found that the loan had a balance of $19,638.49 and that it was a community debt. Accordingly, 1The lender automatically deferred Husband’s loan payments between March 2020 and November 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, beginning in 2016, Husband made multiple successful requests to place his obligation in forbearance. The superior court noted that the testimony regarding the various deferments was “unclear” but found that the loan was “at least . . . in deferment until sometime in late 2021.” Ultimately, however, the court concluded that any deferment and its effect on the loan’s maturity date was irrelevant. 2  IN RE MARRIAGE OF DUVALL Opinion of the Court in dividing the community, the court ordered each party to be responsible for one-half of the loan’s balance: IT IS ORDERED that in fairly and equitably allocating the student loan, [Husband] and [Wife] shall each be responsible for one-half of this community debt; i.e., each party owes $9,819.25. ¶4 After the decree was entered, the parties had no communication regarding the student loan. Although the loan was only in Husband’s name, Wife had been listed as an authorized payor on the account. In June 2018, Wife instructed the lender to direct all future correspondence and communication to Husband. At no time did Wife make any payments toward her share of the balance, either to Husband or to the lender directly. ¶5 In October 2022, Husband paid the lender his share of the student loan. He thereafter sent Wife a letter demanding that she pay her portion of the loan. Wife’s counsel responded to the letter in January 2023, asserting that any attempt to enforce the debt was barred by § 25-318(P)’s two-year statute of limitations. ¶6 In May 2023, Husband filed a petition to enforce the decree, asking the superior court to order Wife to immediately make payments toward her share of the loan, including interest that had accrued, and to award attorney fees based on her failure to pay as ordered. In February 2024, after a hearing, the court found Wife in contempt for knowingly failing to pay her portion of the debt. The court stated, however, that the contempt finding did “not end the inquiry” in light of the statute of limitations issue. The court ultimately concluded that Husband’s enforcement petition was time-barred because he should have raised it within two years of the July 2017 decree. The court accordingly