Legal Case

In Re J.P.S. v. the State of Texas

Court

Court of Appeals of Texas

Decided

June 2, 2025

Jurisdiction

SA

Practice Areas

Juvenile Law
Appellate Law
Mandamus Proceedings

Case Summary

NUMBER 13-25-00291-CV COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG IN RE J.P.S. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Silva, Peña, and Fonseca Memorandum Opinion by Justice Fonseca1 By petition for writ of mandamus, relator J.P.S., a juvenile, asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by not following our mandate and by allowing the State to proceed on a petition for determinate sentence that was filed after we reversed and remanded the case in a previous appeal. See In re J.P.S., No. 13-24-00120-CV, 2024 WL 3199186, at **1–5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 27, 2024, no pet.) 1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); id. R. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions). (mem. op.). A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only when the trial court clearly abused its discretion and the party seeking relief lacks an adequate remedy on appeal. In re Ill. Nat’l Ins., 685 S.W.3d 826, 834 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding). “The relator bears the burden of proving these two requirements.” In re H.E.B. Grocery Co., 492 S.W.3d 300, 302 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). However, a juvenile proceeding is quasi- criminal in nature, and the application of civil or criminal analyses in such cases vary depending on the circumstances presented. See In re L.D.C., 400 S.W.3d 572, 574 (Tex. 2013); In re D.I.B., 988 S.W.2d 753, 756 (Tex. 1999); see also In re State ex rel. Saenz, No. 13-23-00530-CR, 2024 WL 49506, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Jan. 3, 2024, orig. proceeding) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus, the record, and the applicable law, is of the opinion that relator has not met his burden to obtain relief. Accordingly, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus. YSMAEL FONSECA Justice Delivered and filed on the 2nd day of June, 2025. 2

Case Summary

Summary of the key points and legal principles

Legal Topics

Areas of law covered in this case

Writ of Mandamus
Abuse of Discretion
Juvenile Proceedings

Case Information

Detailed case metadata and classifications

Court Proceedings

Date FiledJune 2, 2025
Date DecidedJune 2, 2025

Document Details

Times Cited
7

Legal Classification

JurisdictionSA
Court Type
federal

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Collin McCleary v. CTL Corporation

80% match
Court of Appeals of Texas
Jun 2025

COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS COLLIN McCLEARY, § No. 08-24-00116-CV Appellant, § Appeal from the v. § 109th District Court CTL CORP., § of Winkler County, Texas Appellee. § (TC# DC20-17766) JUDGMENT The Court has considered this cause on the record and concludes there was no error in the judgment. We therefore affirm the judgment of the court below. We further order that Appellee recover from Appellant all costs of appeal, and that this decision be certified below for observance. IT IS SO ORDERED this 11th day of June 2025. MARIA SALAS MENDOZA, Chief Justice Before Salas Mendoza, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ. Palafox, J., concurring without written opinion

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Dept. of Human Services v. M. E.

341 Or. App. 188

80% match
Court of Appeals of Oregon
Jun 2025

188 June 4, 2025 No. 520 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of W. O. A. IV, aka B. B. E., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. M. E., Appellant. Washington County Circuit Court 24JU03934; A185889 Michele C. Rini, Judge. Submitted April 30, 2025. Aron Perez-Selsky filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Stacy M. Chaffin, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and Jacquot, Judge. JACQUOT, J. Reversed. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 188 (2025) 189 JACQUOT, J. In this juvenile dependency case, mother appeals from the juvenile court’s judgment asserting jurisdiction over her infant son, W.1 She asserts that “the juvenile court erred in finding that [her] ‘pattern of criminal activities’ and ‘history of and current substance abuse’ posed a cur- rent threat of serious loss or injury warranting jurisdiction.” Specifically, mother asserts the juvenile court erred, because (1) there was no evidence that mother’s past criminal activi- ties involved children or evinced harm to children; (2) there was no evidence that W has been exposed to controlled sub- stances or that mother used controlled substances around him; (3) there was no evidence, even if mother had recently used controlled substances, that her use impaired her abil- ity to meet W’s basic needs; and (4) at the time of the juris- dictional hearing, mother was not as risk of incarceration while in Oregon. Consequently, in mother’s view, the Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS) did not prove that she exposed her child to a nonspeculative threat of serious loss or injury stemming from her criminal activities and substance abuse.2 ODHS responds that the court properly asserted jurisdiction because “mother’s substance abuse was active at the time of the trial, intertwined with her criminal activity, and combined with the use and possession of firearms, all of which posed a current and non-speculative risk to [W].” Because evidence presented at the time of the juris- dictional hearing did not support a conclusion that mother posed a current and nonspeculative risk to W under ORS 419B.100(1)(c), as further explained below, we reverse. For a juvenile court to take jurisdiction over a child, ODHS must present evidence “sufficient to support a con- clusion that the child’s condition or circumstances expose the child to a current threat of serious loss or injury that is likely to be realized.” Dept. of Human Services v. J. H., 292 Or App 733, 737, 425 P3d 791 (2018) (internal quotation 1 Father is deceased. 2 At the time of trial, W took the same position and asked that the case be dismissed. He does not appear on appeal. 190 Dept. of Human Services v. M. E. marks omitted). Specifically, ODHS “must establish the type, degree, and duration of the harm at issue,” and it must “establish a nexus between the allegedly risk-causing conduct and the harm to the child.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The risk of harm must be “nonspecula- tive”; that is, “there must be a reasonable likelihood that the threat will be realized.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). No party asks for de novo review, nor do we find this to be an exceptional case warranting it. In the absence of a de novo review, in reviewing a juvenile court’s determina- tion of jurisdiction in juvenile dependency proceedings, we: “(1) assume the correctness of the juvenile court’s explicit findings of historical fact if these findings are supported by any evidence in the record; (2) further assume that, if the juvenile court did not explicitly resolve a disputed issue of material fact and it could have reached the disposition that it reached only if it resolved that issue in one way, the court implicitly resolved the issue consistently with that disposition; and (3) assess whether the combination of (1) and (2), along with nonspeculative inferences, was legally sufficient to permit the trial court to determine that ORS 419B.100(1)(c) was satisfied.” Dept. of Human Services v. N. P., 257 Or App 633, 639-40, 307 P3d 444 (2013). In considering this case, we note that the juvenile court made adverse credibility findings against mother. Those findings are supported by the record, and we do not disturb them. Dept. of Human Services v. A. J. G., 304 Or App 221, 230, 465 P3d 293,

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Dept. of Human Services v. M. P.

341 Or. App. 158

80% match
Court of Appeals of Oregon
Jun 2025

158 June 4, 2025 No. 513 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of A. P., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. M. P., Appellant. Clackamas County Circuit Court 24JU01576; A185671 Todd L. Van Rysselberghe, Judge. Submitted April 30, 2025. Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section, and Kyle Sessions, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Shannon T. Reel, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and Jacquot, Judge. JOYCE, J. Affirmed. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 158 (2025) 159 JOYCE, J. In this juvenile dependency case, father appeals from the juvenile court’s judgment asserting jurisdiction over his child A based, in part, on father’s mental health issues and pattern of impulsive behavior.1 Father raises three assignments of error, all of which reduce to the argu- ment that the Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS) failed to prove that father exposed A to a nonspecu- lative threat of serious loss or injury as a result of father’s mental health issues and impulsivity. We affirm. Absent de novo review, which father does not seek, when reviewing the juvenile court’s assertion of jurisdiction, “[w]e view the evidence, as supplemented and buttressed by permissible derivative inferences, in the light most favor- able to the juvenile court’s disposition and assess whether, when so viewed, the record was legally sufficient to permit the outcome.” Dept. of Human Services v. T. L. H. S., 292 Or App 708, 709, 425 P3d 775 (2018). Juvenile court depen- dency jurisdiction is authorized under ORS 419B.100(1)(c) when a child’s condition and circumstances expose them to a current threat of serious loss or injury that will likely be realized. Dept. of Human Services v. A. L., 268 Or App 391, 397-98, 342 P3d 174 (2015). ODHS bears the burden of prov- ing a nexus between the allegedly risk-causing conduct and probable harm to the child. Id. at 398. We conclude that the record before the juvenile court at the July 2024 jurisdiction trial was sufficient to sup- port its determination that then-four-month-old A would be exposed to a nonspeculative threat of serious loss or injury without dependency jurisdiction. Preceding A’s birth, ODHS and the juvenile court had already been involved with father’s family for about two years, in relation to parents’ older child J and two of moth- er’s other children. Father’s relationship with ODHS was contentious and combative, with father frequently sending rambling, hostile, and threatening messages to ODHS staff. The ODHS caseworker believed that father did not perceive 1 Mother did not appeal the jurisdiction judgment and is not a party to this appeal. 160 Dept. of Human Services v. M. P. reality like others, that he did not recognize the concerns that DHS had presented, and that he was unable to discuss his children’s needs. A was born prematurely, in March 2024, and was admitted to the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) and placed on a CPAP machine to address his respiratory dis- tress. While spending time with A in the NICU, father’s behavior was “unusual,” with him making “strange hand and body movements” and talking rapidly to himself, the wall, or someone who was not there. When a doctor and nurses explained that A was in respiratory distress and needed the CPAP machine to assist him with breath- ing, father did not acknowledge what was being said and appeared to not understand, continuing to insist that the CPAP machine was not safe. Father attempted to remove the CPAP machine, but hospital staff stopped him, deter- mined that he should not be left alone with A, and reported the incident to ODHS. Father and mother did not visit A after he was discharged from the hospital into ODHS’s tem- porary custody in April 2024. There is also evidence in the record that the apart- ment where father and mother had been living was unsafe. There was garbage throughout the apartment, including rotting food and used feminine hygiene products, and a thick layer of sawdust from the pallets they broke down and burned for heat covered much of the kitchen. At the jurisdiction trial, father frequently inter- rupted the proceedings, reacting to arguments from the parties and the testimony of witnesses and speaking to him- self or t

Very Similar Similarity

State v. Borovets

341 Or. App. 104

80% match
Court of Appeals of Oregon
Jun 2025

104 June 4, 2025 No. 497 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ANATOLIY M. BOROVETS, Defendant-Appellant. Multnomah County Circuit Court 20CR39111; A181742 Celia A. Howes, Judge. Submitted May 15, 2025. Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Shawn Wiley, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant. Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Shannon T. Reel, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Hellman, Judge, and Jacquot, Judge. TOOKEY, P. J. Affirmed. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 104 (2025) 105 TOOKEY, P. J. Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for one count of first-degree manslaughter, ORS 163.118; one count of failure to perform duties of a driver, ORS 811.705; one count of driving while suspended, ORS 811.182; and one count of reckless driving, ORS 811.140. Defendant raises two assignments of error. In the first, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal of first-degree manslaugh- ter, because the evidence was insufficient for the jury to conclude that he acted “under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life[.]” ORS 163.118(1)(a) (defining first-degree manslaughter). In the second, defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the victim’s wife’s testimony about a statement by the victim under the hearsay exception for excited utter- ances. See OEC 803(2) (describing that exception to the hearsay rule in OEC 802). We conclude that the evidence in the record was sufficient for the jury to conclude that defendant’s conduct manifested an extreme indifference to the value of human life, and that any error in admitting the challenged state- ment was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm defendant’s convictions. In his first assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court “erred in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal” of first-degree manslaughter. Although “defendant does not dispute on appeal that he drove recklessly,” he argues that “the state failed to prove that he did so under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.” Conduct manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life is an essential element of the crime of first-degree manslaughter. ORS 163.118(1)(a). “This court reviews questions of the sufficiency of the evidence in a crim- inal case following a conviction by examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the state to determine whether a rational trier of fact, accepting reasonable inferences and reasonable credibility choices, could have found the essential 106 State v. Borovets element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Cunningham, 320 Or 47, 63, 880 P2d 431 (1994), cert den, 514 US 1005 (1995). “[E]xtreme indifference to the value of human life means ‘a state of mind where an individual cares little about the risk of death of a human being.’ ” State v. Cook, 163 Or App 578, 583, 989 P2d 474 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]t describes a level of recklessness that is charac- terized by a willingness to commit an extremely dangerous act and an indifference as to whether that act could cause the death of another human being.” State v. Ruiz, 333 Or App 565, 566, 553 P3d 60, rev den, 373 Or 121 (2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]o determine whether a defen- dant’s conduct manifests * * * extreme indifference, this court considers circumstances surrounding the conduct that inform the nature of the risk to human life involved and the extent to which a defendant consciously disregarded that risk, * * * including the circumstances before, during, and after the resulting injury or death.” State v. Giron-Cortez, 372 Or 729, 741-42, 557 P3d 505 (2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). Having reviewed the evidence in the record, in the light most favorable to the state, we conclude that it was legally sufficient for the jury to determine, accepting rea- sonable inferences and credibility choices, that defendant’s conduct manifested an extreme indifference to the value of human life. The evidence includes the following. On the night of the incident, defendant drove 50 to 77 miles per hour in a 35-miles per hour speed limit zone in wet conditions. The crash occurred when defendant revved his eng

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Case Details

Legal case information

Status

Decided

Date Decided

June 2, 2025

Jurisdiction

SA

Court Type

federal

Legal Significance

Case importance metrics

Citations
7
Legal Topics
Writ of Mandamus
Abuse of Discretion
Juvenile Proceedings

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AddedJun 7, 2025
UpdatedJun 7, 2025

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