In re: Fred Tucker

FILED JUN 11 2025 NOT FOR PUBLICATION SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT In re: BAP No. CC-24-1139-GFS FRED TUCKER, Debtor. Bk. No. 2:24-bk-15457-VZ FRED TUCKER, Appellant, v. MEMORANDUM* PNC BANK, N.A., Appellee. Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California Vincent Zurzolo, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding Before: GAN, FARIS, and SPRAKER, Bankruptcy Judges. Memorandum by Judge Gan. Concurrence by Judge Gan. INTRODUCTION Chapter 13 1 debtor Fred Tucker (“Debtor”) appeals the bankruptcy court’s order granting stay relief to PNC Bank, N.A. (“PNC”) under § 362(d)(1) and in rem relief under § 362(d)(4). * This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1. 1 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the  Debtor did not obtain a stay pending appeal, and the property was sold to a third party through a nonjudicial foreclosure. Subsequently, the bankruptcy court dismissed the chapter 13 case, and Debtor did not appeal the dismissal order. As a result, we cannot grant effective relief as it pertains to stay relief under § 362(d)(1), and that portion of the appeal is moot. We have previously stated that an appeal from an order entered under § 362(d)(4) is not moot if, as is the case here, Debtor retains possession.2 In his informal brief, Debtor articulates a single argument relating to the stay relief order: PNC did not adequately serve the motion for stay relief on junior lienholders. Debtor lacks standing to assert rights of third parties, and he offers no argument directed to the relief granted against him. Moreover, the court’s decision is amply supported by evidence in the record. Accordingly, we DISMISS the appeal as it pertains to § 362(d)(1), and we AFFIRM it as it pertains to § 362(d)(4). FACTS3 In 1988, Debtor’s mother, Zula Tucker, purchased real property located in Palos Verdes Estates, California (the “Property”). She borrowed Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532. 2 Debtor informed us at oral argument that he remains in the property, and he requested a continuance. That request is DENIED. 3 We exercise our discretion to take judicial notice of documents electronically filed in Debtor’s bankruptcy case and the prior cases involving the Property. See Atwood v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Co. (In re Atwood), 293 B.R. 227, 233 n.9 (9th Cir. BAP 2003). 2 $375,000, secured by a deed of trust on the Property. Through assignments and mergers, PNC became beneficiary of the deed of trust and holder of the note as of 2009. Ms. Tucker transferred the Property to her living trust, and upon her death in 2012, Debtor became successor trustee and sole beneficiary of the trust. PNC asserts that the loan has been in default since 2014, and it fully matured in 2018. Between 2014 and 2023, Debtor filed six unsuccessful lawsuits in state court seeking to prevent foreclosure. Between May 2023 and July 2024, Debtor and his wife, Ida Hanson, filed four bankruptcy petitions involving the Property. PNC obtained stay relief in Debtor’s first chapter 13 case, which was dismissed with a 180-day bar to refiling. Ms. Hanson then filed two consecutive chapter 13 petitions. She voluntarily dismissed the first case in January 2024. In her second case, Ms. Hanson filed a motion to continue the stay pursuant to § 362(c)(3), and PNC filed a motion for stay relief under § 362(d)(1) and (d)(4). The bankruptcy court granted stay relief, but declined to enter in rem relief under § 362(d)(4) to permit Ms. Hanson and Debtor to close on a reverse mortgage which they stated had been approved. The court dismissed the case in April 2024. Debtor and Ms. Hanson did not obtain the reverse mortgage, and Debtor filed the instant case on the eve of foreclosure, in July 2024. PNC filed a motion for stay relief under § 362(d)(1) and (d)(4) based on Debtor’s failure to make payments and his bad faith efforts to delay foreclosure. It