In Re Alicia Glenny v. the State of Texas

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN NO. 03-25-00412-CV In re Alicia Glenny ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FROM TRAVIS COUNTY OPINION Relator Alicia Glenny has filed a petition for writ of mandamus, seeking relief from an order signed by the district court on June 10, 2025, which vacated a temporary ex parte protective order issued on June 6, 2025 on motion of Real Party in Interest, Jeremy Epperson. For the reasons explained below, we conditionally grant mandamus relief. BACKGROUND This proceeding arises out of an application for a protective order brought in Travis County. On May 30, 2025, Relator filed an application for protective order with Travis County, seeking both a temporary and permanent protective order against RPI. The application sought protection for the Relator, another adult, and the Relator’s two minor children, one of whom she shares with RPI, for conduct that allegedly occurred on May 17, 2025 and May 30, 2025. The case was assigned to the duty judge who granted a temporary ex parte protective order on June 6, 2025 and tentatively set a hearing for the permanent order on June 26, 2025.  On June 9, 2025, RPI filed a motion to vacate the temporary ex parte protective order and informed the court that Relator and RPI were parties in a recently concluded child custody case in another Travis County district court. In that case, a five-day jury trial was held on May 19, 2025, and a hearing to address issues not resolved by the jury was held on June 4, 2025. The jury found that the parents should be joint managing conservators with RPI having the exclusive right to designate primary residence within Travis County and its contiguous counties. The judge signed additional agreed temporary orders on June 5, 2025, which were designed to allow RPI to take possession of the child to visit an ill family member beginning on June 8, 2025. Upon learning of the other concurrent case, the judge in the temporary ex parte protective order case granted the motion to vacate on June 10, 2025 without a live, evidentiary hearing. Relator thereafter sought mandamus relief. MANDAMUS STANDARD Mandamus is a discretionary remedy that requires Relator to show that the trial court clearly abused its discretion and that no adequate remedy by appeal exists. See In re K & L Auto Crushers, LLC, 627 S.W.3d 239, 247 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36, 138 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). “An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court's ruling is arbitrary and unreasonable, made without regard for guiding legal principles or supporting evidence.” In re Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am., 494 S.W.3d 708, 712 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding). A trial court also abuses its discretion “when it fails to analyze or apply the law correctly.” Id. Mandamus is appropriate when it will preserve an important statutory right to legal process. In re V.K., 607 S.W.3d 471, 481 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, orig. proceeding) (citing Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 136). In such a circumstance, 2 “the benefits of granting mandamus relief outweigh the detriments.” Id. (citing In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding). DISCUSSION In this petition for mandamus relief, Relator contends that granting a motion to vacate a temporary ex parte protective order without a live, evidentiary hearing violates Texas Family Code § 83.004 and thus constitutes an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Relator also contends that mandamus is the appropriate remedy because no adequate remedy exists on appeal. We agree on both counts. Because this case is brought to preserve a statutory right to legal process, the Relator does not have an adequate remedy at law, and mandamus relief is appropriate. Whether a judge can vacate a temporary ex parte protective order without a live, evidentiary hearing is an issue of first impression in this court. We interpret applicable statutes de novo. See, e.g., State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006). Our objective in construing a statute is to ascertain legislative intent. First Am. Title Ins. v. Combs, 258 S.W. 3d 627, 635 (Tex. 2008). We discern legislative intent from the statute’s language because it is “‘the truest manifestation’ of what lawmakers intended ….” Id. (quoting Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644, 651–52 (Tex. 2006)). If statutory language is unambiguous, we will interpret and apply the statute according to its pla