Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006)
Primary Holding
In a Bivens action alleging retaliation for speech, a plaintiff must allege and prove the absence of probable cause to support the underlying criminal charge in order to state an actionable violation of the First Amendment.
In the case of Hartman v. Moore, a businessman named William Moore claimed that he was unfairly prosecuted because he spoke out against a government policy that favored a competitor's technology. The Supreme Court ruled that if someone wants to sue the government for retaliation against their speech, they must show that there was no good reason (or "probable cause") for the prosecution in the first place. This ruling helps protect consumers by ensuring that their right to speak out against government actions is safeguarded, but it also means they need to prove that any legal action taken against them was without justification. This case is relevant if someone feels they were punished or prosecuted for expressing their opinions or criticisms about government policies or actions.
AI-generated plain-language summary to help you understand this case
In the 1980s, William G. Moore, Jr. was the chief executive of Recognition Equipment Inc. (REI), a company that developed a multiline optical character reader for sorting mail. REI had received substantial funding from the United States Postal Service (USPS) for this technology. However, the USPS was promoting a different approach, the Zip + 4 system, which relied on single-line scanning technology. Moore opposed this policy and actively lobbied against it, arguing that the USPS's reliance on single-line technology would lead to significant financial losses. His efforts included hiring a public relations firm and testifying before Congress. Despite his campaign, REI lost a major contract to a competitor, which led to investigations by Postal Service inspectors into alleged wrongdoing by Moore and REI. Following these investigations, an Assistant United States Attorney decided to prosecute Moore and REI, resulting in a grand jury indictment in 1988. However, after a lengthy trial, the District Court found a "complete lack of direct evidence" connecting Moore and REI to the alleged criminal activities. This case eventually escalated to the Supreme Court, where the central issue was whether a Bivens action for retaliation against Moore's speech could proceed without alleging the absence of probable cause for the underlying criminal charges. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that a lack of probable cause must be both alleged and proven for such a claim to be actionable.
Whether a Bivens action for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment requires the plaintiff to allege and prove the absence of probable cause for the underlying criminal charge.
The judgment is affirmed.
- Court
- Supreme Court
- Decision Date
- January 10, 2006
- Jurisdiction
- federal
- Case Type
- landmark
- Majority Author
- Souter
- Damages Awarded
- N/A
- Data Quality
- high
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006)
Consumer WonThe anti-retaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects employees from employer actions that would dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination, and it is not limited to actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment or occur at the workplace.
Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409 (2005)
Consumer LostThe 6-year statute of limitations in the False Claims Act does not govern civil actions for retaliation under §3730(h); instead, the most closely analogous state limitations period applies.
Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345 (2006)
Consumer LostThe refusal to apply the judgment bar of the Federal Tort Claims Act is not subject to collateral appeal, as it does not constitute a final decision under 28 U.S.C. §1291.
Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9 (2006)
Consumer LostThe Supreme Court held that the Hobbs Act's prohibition on "obstructing, delaying, or affecting commerce" through violence applies only to violent acts committed in furtherance of plans or purposes involving robbery or extortion, rather than to all violent actions that affect interstate commerce.