Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006)
Primary Holding
The Controlled Substances Act does not authorize the Attorney General to prohibit physicians from prescribing regulated drugs for use in physician-assisted suicide when such prescriptions are permitted under state law, as the federal government cannot interfere with state laws that allow this practice.
In Gonzales v. Oregon, the Supreme Court ruled that the federal government cannot stop doctors in Oregon from prescribing medication for assisted suicide if state law allows it. This matters because it means that states have the right to make their own laws about medical practices, including end-of-life options. For consumers, this case protects the right to choose assisted suicide in states where it is legal, ensuring that they can access this option without federal interference, especially if they are facing terminal illnesses.
AI-generated plain-language summary to help you understand this case
In 1994, Oregon became the first state to legalize physician-assisted suicide through the Oregon Death With Dignity Act (ODWDA), which allows terminally ill patients to request a lethal dose of medication from state-licensed physicians under specific safeguards. This law was upheld in a subsequent 1997 ballot measure that sought to repeal it. The medications prescribed under the ODWDA are classified as controlled substances under the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), which regulates their prescription and use. The dispute arose when the Attorney General of the United States, Alberto R. Gonzales, issued an Interpretive Rule on November 9, 2001, stating that the use of controlled substances for physician-assisted suicide is not a legitimate medical practice and is therefore unlawful under the CSA. This rule effectively prohibited physicians in Oregon from prescribing these drugs for the purpose of assisted suicide, conflicting with state law. The state of Oregon challenged this rule, leading to a legal battle over the authority of the Attorney General to regulate medical practices in this context. The case reached the Supreme Court after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against the Attorney General's Interpretive Rule, asserting that it exceeded his authority under the CSA. The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to address whether the CSA permits the Attorney General to prohibit the use of controlled substances for physician-assisted suicide in states where it is legally sanctioned. This case highlights the ongoing national debate surrounding the legality and morality of assisted suicide and the interplay between state and federal law.
Whether the Controlled Substances Act allows the United States Attorney General to prohibit doctors from prescribing regulated drugs for use in physician-assisted suicide, notwithstanding a state law permitting the procedure.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
- Court
- Supreme Court
- Decision Date
- October 5, 2005
- Jurisdiction
- federal
- Case Type
- landmark
- Majority Author
- Kennedy
- Damages Awarded
- N/A
- Data Quality
- high
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)
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Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006)
Consumer WonThe Federal Government may not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act unless it demonstrates that the application of the burden is in furtherance of a compelling government interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007)
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Oregon v. Guzek, 546 U.S. 517 (2006)
Consumer LostThe State may constitutionally limit the innocence-related evidence that a defendant can introduce at a new sentencing proceeding to only that evidence presented at the original trial.