Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006)
Primary Holding
A warrantless search of shared premises is unreasonable and invalid if one co-occupant is present and expressly refuses consent, even if another co-occupant provides consent for the search.
In the case of Georgia v. Randolph, the Supreme Court ruled that police cannot search a shared home without a warrant if one person living there says "no" to the search, even if another person living there says "yes." This is important because it protects your right to privacy in your home; if you are present and refuse consent, the police must respect your wishes. This case is relevant if you’re ever in a situation where police want to search your home and you do not agree to it, as it reinforces your right to say no.
AI-generated plain-language summary to help you understand this case
In the case of Georgia v. Randolph, the underlying events began with a domestic dispute between Scott Randolph and his wife, Janet. After separating in May 2001, Janet returned to their shared residence in Americus, Georgia, on July 6, 2001, with their son. Following a complaint from Janet to the police about Scott's alleged cocaine use and concerns regarding the custody of their child, police officers arrived at the home. Upon Scott's return, he denied the allegations and asserted that it was Janet who had substance abuse issues. During the police's investigation, Janet informed them that there were items of drug evidence in the house and consented to a search, despite Scott's explicit refusal. The procedural history of the case involved Scott Randolph's indictment for possession of cocaine, which stemmed from evidence obtained during the police search of his home. After the initial search, which was conducted with Janet's consent but against Scott's refusal, the police left to obtain a warrant. Upon their return, Janet withdrew her consent, yet the police had already seized some evidence. Scott moved to suppress this evidence, arguing that it was obtained without valid consent due to his explicit objection. The trial court denied his motion, ruling that Janet had the authority to consent to the search. The case reached the Supreme Court of the United States on a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Georgia. The central issue was whether a warrantless search could be deemed lawful when one co-occupant consents while another, present at the scene, expressly refuses. The Court ultimately held that the refusal of a physically present co-occupant prevails over the consent of another, rendering the search unreasonable and invalid as to the objecting occupant.
Whether a warrantless search of a shared residence is lawful when one occupant consents to the search while the other occupant, who is present, expressly refuses consent.
The judgment is reversed.
- Court
- Supreme Court
- Decision Date
- November 8, 2005
- Jurisdiction
- federal
- Case Type
- landmark
- Majority Author
- Souter
- Damages Awarded
- N/A
- Data Quality
- high
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 US 586 (2006)
Consumer LostThe violation of the "knock-and-announce" rule does not require the suppression of evidence obtained during a search conducted pursuant to a valid warrant.
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006)
Consumer LostPolice may enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury, as established by the emergency aid doctrine.
United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90 (2006)
Consumer LostAn anticipatory search warrant is valid under the Fourth Amendment if it is supported by probable cause and describes the triggering condition that must occur before the warrant is executed, but it is not required to include the triggering condition in the warrant itself.
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006)
Consumer LostA suspicionless search of a parolee conducted under California law does not violate the Fourth Amendment, as the conditions of parole significantly diminish the parolee's reasonable expectation of privacy.