Cozy Comfort Co., LLC v. United States

CORRECTED In the United States Court of Federal Claims No. 24-2051C (Filed: June 26, 2025) ) CULMEN INTERNATIONAL, LLC, ) ) Plaintiff, ) v. ) ) THE UNITED STATES, ) ) Defendant, ) and ) ) AMENTUM SERVICES, INC., ) ) Defendant-Intervenor. ) ) ORDER On May 19, 2025, Plaintiff, Culmen International, LLC (“Culmen”), voluntarily dismissed its case without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i), ECF No. 43, effectively agreeing to the government’s proposed corrective action, ECF No. 42. Nearly a month later, on June 12, 2025, Culmen filed a motion, ECF No. 44, for relief from the standard protective order (“PO”), ECF No. 9, which this Court issued at Culmen’s request, ECF No. 7. Culmen’s pending motion seeks an extension of the PO’s record destruction deadline — until sixty days following the conclusion of the government’s corrective action. ECF No. 44. On June 23, 2025, the government filed its timely opposition to Culmen’s motion. ECF No. 46. On balance, this Court agrees with the government, at least in this case: There is nothing unique about Culmen’s circumstance; this case is one of many protests in which the procuring agency decided to take corrective action. If the Court were to grant Culmen’s motion, every protestor under such circumstances might seek the same relief, thus nullifying the important protections within Paragraphs 2 and 20 of the standard protective order. The Court should not let Culmen overcome  the protective order’s express terms so easily. ECF No. 46 at 6. Culmen posits, in contrast, that “[c]ertain arguments and the factual underpinnings of the same, including those attacking the arbitrary removal (or addition) of technical factor-related strengths and weaknesses, may provide a basis for protest in the future, depending on the results of the Agency’s corrective action.” ECF No. 44 at 3. According to Culmen, “[w]ithout continued access to the administrative record from this case, any future complaint would be unable to state a valid basis of protest with respect to such arguments[.]” Id. But Culmen’s argument does not make sense given the government’s representation about what its correction action would entail. The government represented to this Court (and the parties) that the “agency’s corrective action will include cancellation of the award decision, re-evaluation of the most recent proposals submitted by offerors, establishment of a new competitive range, discussions with offerors within the new competitive range (following minor amendments to the solicitation, if necessary), and ultimately a new award decision.” ECF No. 42. Under these circumstances, the new procurement decision will stand on its own: the new award decision will replace the canceled one, and the new award decision may be challenged, if at all, on the basis of the new procurement record. Cf. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of California, -- U.S. --, 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1908 (2020) (holding that, on remand, “the agency can ‘deal with the problem afresh’ by taking new agency action” (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 201 (1947))). Accordingly, the Court is doubtful — although we do not prejudge the issue — that the record of the now-cancelled award decision could possibly be relevant to a new procurement decision. In that regard, if Culmen had an objection to the scope of the corrective action, Culmen should not have acquiesced to it so readily. Vanquish Worldwide, LLC v. United States, 163 Fed. Cl. 57, 71-72 (2022) (parties are bound by agreed-upon corrective action). In addition, Culmen voluntarily dismissed its protest without negotiating any relaxation of the PO’s record destruction deadline that Culmen now seeks to modify. The Court sees no reason to grant Culmen’s request at this late date, particularly when the standard PO contemplates the possibility of corrective action by tying the destruction deadline to the “the conclusion of this action.” ECF No. 9 ¶ 20. Culmen obtained the PO it asked for, and cannot now complain about the unfairness of the PO’s terms.

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS No. 24-1854V DANAH MOORE, Chief Special Master Corcoran Petitioner, Filed: May 29, 2025 v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Respondent. Jimmy A. Zgheib, Zgheib Sayad, P.C., White Plains, NY, for Petitioner. Elizabeth Andary, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent. RULING ON ENTITLEMENT1 On November 12, 2024, Danah Moore filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.2 (the “Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleges that she suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (“SIRVA”) resulting from an influenza vaccine received on September 18, 2023. Petition at 1. Petitioner further alleges that the vaccine was administered in the United States, her left shoulder symptoms have persisted for more than six months, and neither Petitioner, nor any other party, has ever filed any action or accepted compensation in the form of an award or settlement, for Petitioner’s vaccine-related injury. Petition at ¶¶ 4, 28-30. The case was assigned to the Special Processing Unit of the Office of Special Masters. 1 Because this Ruling contains a reasoned explanation for the action taken in this case, it must be made publicly accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, and/or at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc, in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). This means the Ruling will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access. 2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease of citation, all section references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa (2018).  On May 28, 2025, Respondent filed his Rule 4(c) report in which he concedes that Petitioner is entitled to compensation in this case. Respondent’s Rule 4(c) Report at 1. Specifically, Respondent agrees that Petitioner’s alleged injury is consistent with SIRVA as defined by the Vaccine Injury Table in that “petitioner had no history of pain, inflammation, or dysfunction of her left shoulder prior to vaccination; pain occurred within forty-eight hours after receipt of an intramuscular vaccination; pain and reduced range of motion [were] limited to the shoulder in which the vaccine was administered; and no other condition or abnormality has been identified to explain petitioner’s shoulder pain.” Id. at 5. Respondent further agrees that the records demonstrate that Petitioner suffered the residual effects of her condition for more than six months, and has satisfied all legal prerequisites for compensation under the Vaccine Act. Id. In view of Respondent’s position and the evidence of record, I find that Petitioner is entitled to compensation. IT IS SO ORDERED. s/Brian H. Corcoran Brian H. Corcoran Chief Special Master 2

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS No. 24-0688V MARK COUNTS, Chief Special Master Corcoran Petitioner, v. Filed: May 28, 2025 SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Respondent. Daniel Alholm, Alholm Law PC, Chicago, IL, for Petitioner. Mary Novakovic, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent. DECISION ON ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS 1 On April 30, 2024, Mark Counts filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq. 2 (the “Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleged that he suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration following a Tdap vaccination he received on July 17, 2023. Petition, ECF No. 1. On February 28, 2025, I issued a decision awarding compensation to Petitioner based on the parties’ stipulation. ECF No. 24. 1 Because this Decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action taken in this case, it must be made publicly accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, and/or at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc, in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). This means the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other inf ormation, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If , upon review, I agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material f rom public access. 2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease of citation, all section ref erences to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa (2018).  Petitioner has now filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs, requesting an award of $20,402.10 (representing $19,286.00 in fees plus $1,116.10 in costs). Application for Fees and Costs (“Motion”) filed February 28, 2025, ECF No. 29. Furthermore, Petitioner filed a signed statement representing that Petitioner incurred no personal out-of-pocket expenses. ECF No. 29-4. Respondent reacted to the motion on March 14, 2025, reporting that he is satisfied that the statutory requirements for an award of attorney’s fees and costs are met in this case, but deferring resolution of the amount to be awarded to my discretion. Respondent’s Response to Motion at 2-4, ECF No. 32. Petitioner indicated thereafter that he does not intend to file a substantive reply. ECF No. 33. I have reviewed the billing records submitted with Petitioner’s request. The rates requested for work performed through the end of 2024 are reasonable and consistent with prior determinations and will therefore be adopted. Petitioner has also requested the hourly rates of $500.00 for 2025 work performed by his attorney Daniel Alholm, representing a rate increase of $25 from the previous year; the hourly rate of $165.00 for paralegal work performed by Mr. Alholm in the 2022-25 timeframe; and the hourly rate of $170.00 for paralegal work performed by Ms. Grace Cottingham in 2024. I find the proposed rates to be reasonable and hereby adopt them. However, a few of the tasks performed by Attorney Alholm in this matter are more properly billed using a paralegal rate. 3 “Tasks that can be completed by a paralegal or a legal assistant should not be billed at an attorney’s rate.” Riggins v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-382V, 2009 WL 3319818, at *21 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 15, 2009). “[T]he rate at which such work is compensated turns not on who ultimately performed the task but instead turns on the nature of the task performed.” Doe/11 v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. XX-XXXXV, 2010 WL 529425, at *9 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 29, 2010). Although these billing entries are reasonable, they must be charged at a reduced rate comparable to that of a paralegal. Application of the foregoing reduces the amount of fees to be awarded by $625.00. 4 3 Entries considered paralegal in nature include drafting and filing basic documents such as an exhibit list, civil cover sheet, certif icate of service, PAR Questionnaire, notice of f iling exhibit list, statement of completion, cover sheet, joint notices not to seek review, and f iling medical records. See billing entries dated: 4/30/24 (two entries); 5/18/24; 5/19/24; 2/28/25 (two entries). Id. ECF No. 29-2. 4 This amount consists of ($475.00 - $165.00 = $310.00 x 1.80 hrs.) + ($500.00

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS NOT FOR PUBLICATION ______________________________________ ) DEE MONBO, ) ) Plaintiff, ) No. 24-cv-2139 ) v. ) Filed: June 16, 2025 ) THE UNITED STATES, ) ) Defendant. ) ______________________________________ ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER This action concerns Plaintiff Dee Monbo’s challenge to the Federal Aviation Administration’s (“FAA”) decision to cancel a procurement solicitation. Ms. Monbo alleges that she submitted a joint proposal with Monbo Group International (“MGI”) in response to the solicitation, and that the FAA’s cancellation was both improper and prejudicial. Before the Court is the Government’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 41(b) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Government’s Motion. I. BACKGROUND On December 27, 2024, Ms. Monbo, who is proceeding pro se, filed this bid protest. See Pl.’s Compl., ECF No. 1. On January 15, 2025, Ms. Monbo filed an Amended Complaint. See ECF No. 8. In the Amended Complaint, Ms. Monbo describes herself as a “Federal Contractor” who “is an offeror of Project Manager services.” Id. ¶ 4. She alleges that in “late 2023” the FAA issued Request for Proposal 6973GH-23-R-00147 (“Solicitation”) related to a proposed contract for financial services. Id. ¶ 16. She asserts that her “joint proposal with Monbo Group International . . . [was] the lowest priced proposal (i.e the winning bid),” id. ¶ 18, but the joint proposal did not result in an award because “the Agency improperly canceled the solicitation,” id. ¶ 19. Ms. Monbo alleges that the FAA’s cancelling the Solicitation violated Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) 14.404-1(a)(1)’s compelling-reason requirement, and further that this “regulatory violation . . . prejudiced Plaintiff and MGI,” who would have won the contract but for the improper cancellation. Id. ¶ 21. She further contends that she “had a substantial chance of being acquired [by MGI] to meet the needs of the Agency had the violation not occurred.” Id. at 6 (“Grounds for Protest” ¶ 11) (alteration in original). Ms. Monbo lists eleven grounds for protest, including that the FAA’s cancellation of the Solicitation “violated the compelling-reason requirement,” “violates FAR 15.206,” “is improper,” “was unreasonable,” “was arbitrary and capricious,” “lacks a rational basis,” “is pretextual,” is “conclusory and insufficiently documented,” and “is contrary to law.” Id. at 5–6. She requests injunctive relief in the form of an order “SETTING ASIDE as invalid the Agency’s cancellation of all bids” for the solicitation in question, as well as reasonable fees and expenses. Id. at 7. The Court held an initial status conference on January 30, 2025. On January 31, 2025, Ms. Monbo filed a Motion to Introduce Evidence of COFC Jurisdiction. See ECF No. 11. In her motion, Ms. Monbo argues that the Court has jurisdiction over her protest because the FAA’s Office of Dispute Resolution for Acquisition (“ODRA”) does not have jurisdiction. She also describes herself as “a proposed subcontractor of MGI,” id. at 2, which is a different characterization than what she alleges in her Amended Complaint, wherein she purports to be a contractor who is jointly collaborating with MGI, see ECF No. 8 ¶¶ 4–10. The Government moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint on February 7, 2025, arguing that (1) the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear Ms. Monbo’s protest because protests of FAA 2 procurements must be brought before ODRA; (2) Ms. Monbo has no standing to sue because she did not submit a proposal in response to the Solicitation (only MGI did); and (3) Ms. Monbo cannot represent MGI as the real party in interest because she is not an attorney and is bringing this protest pro se. See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 12. On April 8, 2025, Ms. Monbo filed her Response to the Government’s Motion to Dismiss. See ECF No. 16. Ms. Monbo’s principal response is that the Court’s jurisdiction over her claim has already been determined in a separate suit that she filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (“District Court case”). Ms. Monbo requests that if the Court “chooses not to decide the controversy,” the Court transfer her case to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Id. at 4. The Government did not f

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS No. 19-675V ************************* * GENA BINKLEY KOTCH, * Chief Special Master Corcoran * Petitioner, * Filed: May 20, 2025 * v. * * SECRETARY OF HEALTH * AND HUMAN SERVICES, * * Respondent. * * ************************* Robert J. Krakow, Law Office of Robert J. Krakow, P.C., New York, NY, for Petitioner. Sarah B. Rifkin, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent. DECISION GRANTING IN PART FINAL AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS 1 On May 7, 2019, Gena Binkley Kotch filed a petition seeking compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (the “Vaccine Program”). 2 Petitioner alleged that she suffered Guillain-Barré syndrome or peripheral neuropathy as a result of an influenza vaccine she received on January 27, 2018. Petition (ECF No. 1) at 1. The matter was originally set for a two-day Entitlement Hearing to take place on December 9, 2024, but the parties were able to successfully settle the case before then, and I issued a decision awarding Petitioner compensation. See Decision, dated Feb. 27, 2025 (ECF No. 112). 1 "Under Vaccine Rule 18(b), each party has fourteen (14) days within which to request redaction “of any information furnished by that party: (1) that is a trade secret or commercial or financial in substance and is privileged or confidential; or (2) that includes medical files or similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.” Vaccine Rule 18(b). Otherwise, the whole Decision will be available to the public in its present form. Id." 2 The Vaccine Program comprises Part 2 of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3758, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 through 34 (2012) (“Vaccine Act” or “the Act”). Individual section references hereafter will be to § 300aa of the Act (but will omit that statutory prefix).  Petitioner previously filed a motion for interim attorney’s fees and costs, but has since filed this present motion, and requests that it be combined with the pending fees request. See Motion, dated Dec. 19, 2023 (ECF No. 75) (“Interim Fees Mot.”); Motion, dated Apr. 12, 2025 (ECF No. 117) (“Final Fees Mot.”). In total, Petitioner requests $333,966.44 in attorney’s fees and costs (reflecting $280,092.31 in fees, plus $53,874.13 in costs) for the work of attorneys and staff at the Law Office of Robert J. Krakow, P.C. Final Fees Mot. at 13, 42. Respondent reacted to the present fees request on April 28, 2025. See Response, dated Apr. 28, 2025 (ECF No. 128). Respondent agrees that Petitioner has satisfied the statutory requirements for a fees award, and otherwise defers the calculation of the amount to be awarded to my discretion. Resp. at 2, 5. Petitioner filed a reply, maintaining her position and requesting that she be awarded the requested fees and costs as indicated. Reply, dated May 2, 2025 (ECF No. 122). For the reasons set forth below, I hereby GRANT IN PART Petitioner’s motion, awarding fees and costs in the total amount of $332,960.24. I. Calculation of Fees Because Petitioner’s claim was successful, she is entitled to a fees and costs award— although only “reasonable” fees or costs may be awarded in the Program. Determining the appropriate amount of the fees award is a two-part process. The first part involves application of the lodestar method—“multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.” Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)). The second part involves adjusting the lodestar calculation up or down to take relevant factors into consideration. Id. at 1348. This standard for calculating a fee award is considered applicable in most cases where a fee award is authorized by federal statute. Hensely v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429–37 (1983). An attorney’s reasonable hourly rate is determined by the “forum rule,” which bass the proper hourly rate to be awarded on the forum in which the relevant court sits (Washington, D.C., for Vaccine Act cases), except where an attorney’s work was not performed in the forum and there is a substantial difference in rates (the so-called “Davis” exception”). Avera, 515 F.3d at 1348 (citing Davis Cty. Solid Waste Mgmt. & Energy Recovery Special Serv. Dist. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 169 F.3d 755, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1999)