Collin McCleary v. CTL Corporation
Court
Court of Appeals of Texas
Decided
June 11, 2025
Jurisdiction
SA
Importance
45%
Case Summary
COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS COLLIN McCLEARY, § No. 08-24-00116-CV Appellant, § Appeal from the v. § 109th District Court CTL CORP., § of Winkler County, Texas Appellee. § (TC# DC20-17766) MEMORANDUM OPINION This case involves the explosion of a pipeline when it became over-pressurized while nitrogen was being pumped into it. Appellant Collin McCleary alleged that the explosion, and his injuries, were caused by the negligence of CTL Corporation. McCleary appeals the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of CTL. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1 DCP Operating Company, LP was constructing the Red Bluff Loop Pipeline in West Texas. It contracted with Holloman Corporation to build the pipeline and with CTL to oversee the construction. Martin Smith was CTL’s chief inspector for the project. 1 The facts are taken from the parties’ pleadings and summary judgment evidence. The facts are largely undisputed; the parties only disagree on whether those facts, as a matter of law, entitle CTL to summary judgment. For the final stages of construction, Holloman hired N2 Solutions, LLC to apply a “nitrogen blanket”—pumping the pipeline with nitrogen to purge it of all oxygen. McCleary, an employee of WestAir Gases & Equipment, delivered the nitrogen to the Wink interconnect station. Using a “Y” connector, an N2 employee pumped the nitrogen from the truck into two segments of the pipeline totaling 110 miles, one branch going east towards the Roberts Ranch connection site and the other going west towards the Orla connection site. The Y connector was equipped with a pressure relief pop-off safety valve (PSV) on one side of the Y connector, the side that led to the Orla branch of the pipeline.2 The Orla segment reached the desired pressure, and someone closed the entry point valve sealing the end of that section of the pipeline. An N2 technician also closed a valve on the Y connector because, as he testified, he did not trust the entry point valve. Closing that second valve isolated the PSV, so that it no longer detected pressure changes. Despite continuous pumping, the pressure reading for the Roberts Ranch segment of the pipeline remained at 0. The only pressure gauge at the Wink interconnect station was digital and required electricity to operate. To get a reading from that gauge, Smith turned on a generator. The generator powered all the equipment at the site, including the pipeline. In his deposition, Smith admitted that he went beyond his job responsibilities (inspecting and overseeing) by turning on the generator and powering up the site. The pipeline was equipped with a safety feature which automatically closes gate valves when low pressure is detected.3 Smith, as well as employees of Holloman and N2, testified that they did not know that the automatic system was installed on the pipeline. When Smith turned on 2 When pressure reaches a designated point, the PSV will release air and make a loud noise to alert the crew that the pressure is approaching its limit. 3 As was explained during oral argument, the safety feature is designed to prevent environmental leakage when the pipeline is operational. It assumes that a low-pressure reading is caused by a breach in the line and automatically closes valves to contain the gas. 2 the generator, the low pressure triggered this automatic system and the gate valves closed. N2 continued to pump nitrogen into what was now only 120 feet of pipeline instead of 110 miles. Because the PSV was isolated, there was no warning that pressure was dangerously high. About ten minutes after turning on the generator, the pipeline exploded. McCleary alleged that the explosion caused him hearing loss and injuries to his back and shoulder. II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND McCleary filed a suit for negligence and gross negligence against CTL.4 After discovery was conducted, CTL filed a combined traditional and no-evidence motion for summary judgment. In the no-evidence motion, it argued that McCleary had no evidence of any of the elements of negligence or gross negligence. In the traditional motion, CTL argued that, as a matter of law, two elements of McCleary’s claims (duty and foreseeability) were conclusively negated. McCleary filed a response and summary judgment evidence, to which CTL objected. The trial court sustained CTL’
Case Details
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Status
Decided
Date Decided
June 11, 2025
Jurisdiction
SA
Court Type
federal
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COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS
COLLIN McCLEARY, § No. 08-24-00116-CV
Appellant, § Appeal from the
v. § 109th District Court
CTL CORP., § of Winkler County, Texas
Appellee. § (TC# DC20-17766)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case involves the explosion of a pipeline when it became over-pressurized while
nitrogen was being pumped into it. Appellant Collin McCleary alleged that the explosion, and his
injuries, were caused by the negligence of CTL Corporation. McCleary appeals the trial court’s
summary judgment in favor of CTL.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
DCP Operating Company, LP was constructing the Red Bluff Loop Pipeline in West Texas.
It contracted with Holloman Corporation to build the pipeline and with CTL to oversee the
construction. Martin Smith was CTL’s chief inspector for the project.
1 The facts are taken from the parties’ pleadings and summary judgment evidence. The facts are largely undisputed; the parties only disagree on whether those facts, as a matter of law, entitle CTL to summary judgment. For the final stages of construction, Holloman hired N2 Solutions, LLC to apply a “nitrogen
blanket”—pumping the pipeline with nitrogen to purge it of all oxygen. McCleary, an employee
of WestAir Gases & Equipment, delivered the nitrogen to the Wink interconnect station. Using a
“Y” connector, an N2 employee pumped the nitrogen from the truck into two segments of the
pipeline totaling 110 miles, one branch going east towards the Roberts Ranch connection site and
the other going west towards the Orla connection site. The Y connector was equipped with a
pressure relief pop-off safety valve (PSV) on one side of the Y connector, the side that led to the
Orla branch of the pipeline.2 The Orla segment reached the desired pressure, and someone closed
the entry point valve sealing the end of that section of the pipeline. An N2 technician also closed
a valve on the Y connector because, as he testified, he did not trust the entry point valve. Closing
that second valve isolated the PSV, so that it no longer detected pressure changes. Despite
continuous pumping, the pressure reading for the Roberts Ranch segment of the pipeline remained
at 0. The only pressure gauge at the Wink interconnect station was digital and required electricity
to operate. To get a reading from that gauge, Smith turned on a generator. The generator powered
all the equipment at the site, including the pipeline. In his deposition, Smith admitted that he went
beyond his job responsibilities (inspecting and overseeing) by turning on the generator and
powering up the site.
The pipeline was equipped with a safety feature which automatically closes gate valves
when low pressure is detected.3 Smith, as well as employees of Holloman and N2, testified that
they did not know that the automatic system was installed on the pipeline. When Smith turned on
2 When pressure reaches a designated point, the PSV will release air and make a loud noise to alert the crew that the pressure is approaching its limit. 3 As was explained during oral argument, the safety feature is designed to prevent environmental leakage when the pipeline is operational. It assumes that a low-pressure reading is caused by a breach in the line and automatically closes valves to contain the gas.
2
the generator, the low pressure triggered this automatic system and the gate valves closed. N2
continued to pump nitrogen into what was now only 120 feet of pipeline instead of 110 miles.
Because the PSV was isolated, there was no warning that pressure was dangerously high. About
ten minutes after turning on the generator, the pipeline exploded. McCleary alleged that the
explosion caused him hearing loss and injuries to his back and shoulder.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
McCleary filed a suit for negligence and gross negligence against CTL.4 After discovery
was conducted, CTL filed a combined traditional and no-evidence motion for summary judgment.
In the no-evidence motion, it argued that McCleary had no evidence of any of the elements of
negligence or gross negligence. In the traditional motion, CTL argued that, as a matter of law, two
elements of McCleary’s claims (duty and foreseeability) were conclusively negated. McCleary
filed a response and summary judgment evidence, to which CTL objected. The trial court sustained
CTL’
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Case Details
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Status
Decided
Date Decided
June 11, 2025
Jurisdiction
SA
Court Type
federal
Legal Significance
Case importance metrics
Metadata
Additional information
Quick Actions
Case management tools