City of East Lansing v. Joanne L Danzig

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS CITY OF EAST LANSING, UNPUBLISHED June 11, 2025 Plaintiff-Appellee, 10:22 AM v No. 370806 Ingham Circuit Court JOANNE L. DANZIG, LC No. 24-000188-AR Defendant-Appellant. Before: YATES, P.J., and YOUNG and WALLACE, JJ. PER CURIAM. In this case we once again address an issue that is settled law. “Failing to provide identification upon request by a police officer is not itself a crime or statutory offense in Michigan.” People v Murawski, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 365852); slip op at 9. Defendant was part of a group involved in a dispute over a bill at a hotel bar. Hotel staff called the police, and the police briefly detained defendant in an alleged Terry1 stop. Defendant refused to give an officer her identification when she was asked. The officer arrested defendant under East Lansing City Ordinance § 26-52(18), and defendant was charged under the same ordinance. Defendant moved to dismiss the charge in the district court because, she argued, she did not physically resist or obstruct the officer and, therefore, she could not have violated the ordinance. The district court denied her motion, and the circuit court denied her application for leave to appeal. We reverse and remand with the instruction to dismiss defendant’s charge. I. BACKGROUND After officers arrived at the hotel, defendant’s husband was asked for his identification, which he provided. After defendant twice refused to provide her identification to an officer, the officer told defendant that she would be arrested if she did not provide identification. Defendant 1 Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968). -1- then held out her wrists to allow the officer to arrest her. Defendant was cited for a misdemeanor violation of East Lansing City Ordinance § 26-52(18), which provides that “No person shall . . . [p]hysically obstruct, resist or hinder any member of the police force, any peace officer, or firefighter in the discharge of their lawful duties.” Defendant moved in the district court to dismiss the charge on the grounds that the language of the ordinance required defendant to physically “obstruct, resist or hinder,” and she argued that she physically complied with the arrest. The district court denied her motion. Defendant applied for leave to appeal to the circuit court, and the circuit court denied her request for leave. Defendant now appeals to this Court as on leave granted.2 II. ANALYSIS Defendant argues that her conduct did not rise to the level of physical obstruction, resistance, or hindrance, and, therefore, she was not in violation of the ordinance. “Municipal ordinances are interpreted and reviewed in the same manner as statutes.” City of Grand Rapids v Brookstone Capital, LLC, 334 Mich App 452, 457; 965 NW2d 232 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, the rules governing statutory interpretation apply and our review of the trial court’s interpretation of the ordinance is de novo. Id. The parties disputed in the trial court whether the adverb “physically” modified only the word “obstruct,” or all verbs in the ordinance. The district court agreed with defendant that it modified “obstruct,” “resist,” and “hinder.” On appeal, the prosecution continues to argue that “physically” should only modify “obstruct.” However, our case law leads us to conclude that we must read the ordinance by applying the adverb “physically” to all of the verbs in the series because “ ‘[w]hen several words are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the first and other words as to the last, the natural construction of the language demands that the clause be read as applicable to all.’ ” Sanford v State, 506 Mich 10, 20 n 18; 954 NW2d 82 (2020), quoting Porto Rico R, Light & Power Co v Mor, 253 US 345, 348; 40 S Ct 516; 64 L Ed 944 (1920). The Michigan Supreme Court has articulated that physical obstruction is present when a police officer is “faced with a situation in which his next act would, more likely than not, involve physical confrontation.” People v Vasquez, 465 Mich 83, 98; 631 NW2d 711 (2001). It does not require actual interference; “[r]ather, any conduct that rises