Legal Case

Brown v. Multnomah County Assessor

Brown

Court

Unknown Court

Decided

July 29, 2025

Importance

35%

Standard

Practice Areas

Property Law
Tax Law
NEW FEATURE

Agentic Research

Unlock the power of AI-driven legal research. Our advanced agentic system autonomously analyzes cases, identifies patterns, and delivers comprehensive insights in minutes, not hours.

AI-Powered Analysis
Precise Legal Research
10x Faster Results

Join 2,500+ legal professionals

Case Details

Case Details

Legal case information

Status

Decided

Date Decided

July 29, 2025

Legal Significance

Case importance metrics

Importance Score
Standard
Score35%
Citations
0
Legal Topics
Property Assessment
Due Process
Taxation

Metadata

Additional information

AddedJul 29, 2025
UpdatedJul 29, 2025

Quick Actions

Case management tools

AI-enhanced legal analysis

Case Summary

AI Generated

AI-generated comprehensive summary with legal analysis

Legal Topics

Areas of law covered in this case

Property Assessment
Due Process
Taxation

Case Information

Detailed case metadata and classifications

Court Proceedings

Date FiledJuly 29, 2025
Date DecidedJuly 29, 2025

Document Details

Times Cited
0
Importance Score
0.3
Judicial Panel
Davis
Opinion Author
Davis

Similar Cases

5

Cases with similar legal principles and precedents

Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Brooke Lierman

80% match
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Aug 2025

USCA4 Appeal: 24-1727 Doc: 48 Filed: 08/15/2025 Pg: 1 of 23 PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 24-1727 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; NETCHOICE; COMPUTER & COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. BROOKE E. LIERMAN, Defendant - Appellee. NATIONAL TAXPAYERS UNION FOUNDATION, Amicus Supporting Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Lydia Kay Griggsby, District Judge. (1:21-cv-00410-LKG) Argued: May 6, 2025 Decided: August 15, 2025 Before RICHARDSON and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge. Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Richardson wrote the opinion, in which Judge Heytens and Judge Floyd joined. USCA4 Appeal: 24-1727 Doc: 48 Filed: 08/15/2025 Pg: 2 of 23 ARGUED: Scott Allen Keller, LEHOTSKY KELLER COHN LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Ryan Robert Dietrich, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Tara S. Morrissey, Jennifer B. Dickey, UNITED STATES CHAMBER LITIGATION CENTER, Washington, D.C., for Appellant Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America. Michael B. Kimberly, Charles Seidell, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Anthony G. Brown, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Tyler Martinez, NATIONAL TAXPAYERS UNION FOUNDATION, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae. 2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1727 Doc: 48 Filed: 08/15/2025 Pg: 3 of 23 RICHARDSON, Circuit Judge: In 1765, the British Parliament imposed a novel tax on the fledgling colonies in North America. The Stamp Act was reviled because it taxed most everything written on paper, from playing cards to newspapers. This not only cost people money but jeopardized their ability to speak on matters of public concern. John Adams roused Massachusetts against the tax, calling it an “enormous Engine . . . for battering down all the Rights and Liberties of America.” 1 The Adams Papers 263 (L.H. Butterfield ed., 1961). Thousands of citizens protested when the dreaded stamps arrived in Charleston harbor, besieging the stamp officers in Fort Johnson for nine days. D.D. Wallace, Constitutional History of South Carolina From 1725 To 1775 at 32–33 (1899). And across the colonies, outrage about the tax prompted the colonists to begin developing the arguments that would later form the Declaration of Independence. See generally Daniel Dulany, Considerations on the Propriety of Imposing Taxes in the British Colonies (1765). In more ways than one, the Stamp Act and other taxes like it ignited revolution. Two and a half centuries later, the State of Maryland imposed another tax—not on those who print pamphlets but their internet-age successors. This tax applies to the money made by advertising on the internet. But as some things have changed, others have remained the same. It is no less true today than centuries ago that “the power to tax involves the power to destroy.” M‘Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 431 (1819). And complaining about taxes remains a grand American political tradition. Perhaps fearing such complaints, Maryland paired its tax with another rule. Companies that make money advertising on the internet must not only pay the tax but avoid 3 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1727 Doc: 48 Filed: 08/15/2025 Pg: 4 of 23 telling their customers how it affects pricing: No line items, no surcharges, no fees. If companies pass on the cost of the tax, they must do so in silence—keeping customers in the dark about why prices have gone up and thereby insulating Maryland from political responsibility. That provision is the subject of this appeal. Plaintiffs, a group of trade associations, challenge Maryland’s rule on grounds that it abridges their freedom to speak. They say Maryland has no reason, other than insulating themselves from criticism and political accountability, to forbid them to explai

Very Similar Similarity

Shirley Jean Cupples Blankenship v. Charles Gary Blankenship, Sr. and Charles Gary Blankenship, II v. Shirley Jean Cupples Blankenship

80% match
Court of Appeals of Tennessee
Aug 2025

08/08/2025 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON April 23, 2025 Session SHIRLEY JEAN CUPPLES BLANKENSHIP v. CHARLES GARY BLANKENSHIP SR. AND CHARLES GARY BLANKENSHIP II v. SHIRLEY JEAN CUPPLES BLANKENSHIP Appeal from the Chancery Court for Gibson County No. H6329, H6634 Michael Mansfield, Chancellor ___________________________________ No. W2024-01248-COA-R3-CV ___________________________________ This appeal arises from the death of the husband during a divorce proceeding. While the divorce was pending, the spouses sold real property they owned as tenants by the entirety and deposited the proceeds with the clerk of the court pursuant to an agreed order. Subsequently, the husband died and the wife filed a motion to dismiss the case and to distribute the proceeds. The chancery court determined that the husband’s death abated the divorce proceedings and that the proceeds had been owned by the spouses as tenants by the entirety. Thus, the court granted the motion to dismiss and determined that the wife was entitled to distribution of the proceeds as the surviving tenant by the entirety. The spouses’ son, acting as administrator of the husband’s estate, appeals. We affirm. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed. CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which KENNY W. ARMSTRONG and VALERIE L. SMITH, JJ., joined. Michael R. Flynn, Germantown, Tennessee, for the appellants, Charles Gary Blankenship II and Probate Advance, LLC. Jonathan O. Steen, Nicholas B. Latimer, and Sara E. Barnett, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellee, Shirley Jean Cupples Blankenship. OPINION I. Facts and Procedural History Charles Gary Blankenship Sr. (“Husband”) and Shirley Jean Cupples Blankenship (“Wife”) were married on August 22, 1981, in Jackson, Tennessee. One child was born of the marriage, Charles Gary Blankenship II (“Son”). Son is serving as the administrator of Husband’s estate and is one of the appellants in this matter. During the marriage, the spouses obtained the following pieces of real property in Humboldt, Tennessee: 157 Pleasant Hill Road, 3855 East End Drive, and a lot adjacent to the 3855 East End Drive property (collectively “the Properties”). The spouses owned the Properties as tenants by the entirety. On March 6, 2020, Wife filed a complaint for divorce in the Madison County Chancery Court. The spouses later agreed for the case to be transferred to the Gibson County Chancery Court. Litigation ensued, and on September 30, 2022, Husband filed a motion requesting that a guardian ad litem be appointed on his behalf. The motion was granted by order entered on January 20, 2023. The guardian ad litem subsequently submitted a report explaining that Husband had experienced several health issues and recommended that Son be appointed as conservator over Husband’s person and that a certified public accountant be appointed as conservator over his property. On January 5, 2023, an “Agreed Order” was entered in which the spouses agreed that the proceeds derived from the sale of any marital property would be paid to the Clerk and Master of the Chancery Court of Gibson County. Although it is unclear from the record when this occurred, the spouses subsequently sold the Properties. The proceeds derived from the sale of the Properties were deposited with the Gibson County Clerk and Master. On August 15, 2023, Husband died prior to a final decree of divorce having been entered. Wife filed a “Motion to Dismiss and for Distribution of Funds” on September 8, 2023, in which she asserted that Husband’s death abated the divorce proceedings. Wife also claimed that the proceeds derived from the sale of the Properties had been owned by the spouses as tenants by the entirety and thus the proceeds had “vested” in her upon Husband’s death as the surviving tenant by the entirety. Meanwhile, on October 27, 2023, Son filed a verified complaint in his capacity as the administrator of Husband’s estate in the Chancery Court of Hamilton County, Tennessee.1 The complaint alleged that the funds being held by the Gibson County Clerk and Master were assets of Husband’s estate. Son further sought an order enjoining Wife from obtaining the funds pending resolution of the complaint. This case was eventually transferred to the Gibson County Chancery Court. Subsequently, the court entered an order consolidating the divorce proceeding, the above- described action filed by Son, and a “Probate Action” Son had also filed in the Hamilton County Chancery Court. The court determined that all three cases were predicated on the disposal of a single issue: “who is entitled to receive disburse

Very Similar Similarity

Alma Gasca v. Launchbase Properties, LLC

80% match
Court of Appeals of Texas
Jun 2025

COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS ALMA GASCA, § No. 08-24-00134-CV Appellant, § Appeal from the v. § County Court at Law No. 7 LAUNCHBASE PROPERTIES, LLC, § of El Paso County, Texas Appellee. § (TC# 2024-CCV00278) JUDGMENT The Court has considered this cause on the record and concludes there was no error in the judgment. We therefore affirm the judgment of the court below. We further order that Appellee recover from Appellant all costs of appeal, for which let execution issue. This decision shall be certified below for observance. IT IS SO ORDERED this 19th day of June 2025. GINA M. PALAFOX, Justice Before Salas Mendoza, C.J., Palafox, J., and Rodriguez, C.J. (Ret) Rodriguez, C.J. (Ret.) (Sitting by Assignment)

Very Similar Similarity

Keaau Development Partnership LLC v. Lawrence, Jr.

80% match
Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals
Jun 2025

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX 20-JUN-2025 08:58 AM Dkt. 86 OAWST NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF HAWAI I KEAAU DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIP LLC., Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant/Counterclaimant-Appellee, v. PATRICK JOHN LAWRENCE, JR. dba PJ'S CONSTRUCTION, Defendant/Counterclaimant/Cross-Claimant/ Counterclaim Defendant/Cross-Claim Defendant-Appellant, and JANEL M. ARAUJO INC.; JANEL ARAUJO, Defendants/Counterclaim Defendants/ Cross-Claim Defendants-Appellees, and ROBERT C. SMELKER, Defendant/Cross-Claim Defendant-Appellee, and ANNALEINE MELICIA REYNOLDS, Defendant/Cross-Claim Defendant/Counterclaimant-Appellee, and LEORA WHITE THOMPSON, Defendant/Cross-Claim Defendant-Appellee, and HEIRS OR ASSIGNS OF LEORA WHITE THOMPSON, Defendants-Appellees, and COUNTY OF HAWAI I, Defendant/Cross-Claim Defendant-Appellee, and JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10; DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10; DOE ENTITIES 1-10; DOE TRUSTS 1-10; AND DOE GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES 1-10, Defendants APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT (CIVIL NO. 3CCV-XX-XXXXXXX) ORDER APPROVING STIPULATION TO DISMISS APPEAL (By: Leonard, Acting Chief Judge, Hiraoka and Wadsworth, JJ.) Upon consideration of the Stipulation to Dismiss Appeal, filed May 8, 2025, by Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant/ Counterclaimant-Appellant Keaau Development Partnership LLC, the papers in support, and the record, it appears that (1) the appeal has been docketed; (2) the parties stipulate to dismiss the appeal and bear their own fees and costs; (3) the Stipulation is NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER signed by counsel for all appearing parties; and (4) dismissal is authorized by Hawai i Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 42(b). Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Stipulation is approved and the appeal is dismissed. The parties shall bear their own fees and costs. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all pending motions are dismissed. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai i, June 20, 2025. /s/ Katherine G. Leonard Acting Chief Judge /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka Associate Judge /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth Associate Judge 2

Very Similar Similarity