Bartolome Padron v. Thomas G. Staples, Karen Staples, Individually and as Co-Trustees of the Staples Revocable Trust, Gene W. Blacklock, and Ezra Burns

Filed 6/30/25 P. v. Martin CA1/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A170261 v. (San Francisco City & County JOHN MARTIN, Super. Ct. Nos. 21011785, SCN234759) Defendant and Appellant. MEMORANDUM OPINION1 After a jury found John Martin guilty of first degree burglary (Pen. Code,2 § 459; count I) and possession of burglary tools (§ 466; count II), he was sentenced to four years in state prison for count I, and a concurrent 180- day jail term for count II. In this appeal, Martin argues that the trial court’s purported failure to stay the sentence for count II violated section 654, which proscribes “ ‘multiple punishments for a single act or indivisible course of conduct.’ ” (People v. Ibarra (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1070, 1083.) We disagree and affirm the judgment accordingly. 1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1.) We provide a limited factual summary because our opinion is unpublished and the parties know, or should know, “the facts of the case and its procedural history.” (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851.) 2 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.  As a preliminary matter, the Attorney General contends the appeal is moot because appellant has already served his sentence and therefore no effective relief can be granted. (People v. Travis (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1271, 1280.) In his reply, Martin correctly notes that a “criminal case should not be considered moot where a defendant has completed a sentence where . . . the sentence may have ‘disadvantageous collateral consequences.’ ” (People v. Ellison (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1368–1369.) Although Martin does not identify with any specificity the disadvantageous collateral consequences he might face, we recognize that if Martin were to prevail on his claim, his record would suggest that in this case he engaged in a single criminal act instead of two. We therefore exercise our discretion to hear the appeal to give Martin the “opportunity to clear [his] name” to some degree. (People v. Delong (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 482, 484.) “ ‘Whether section 654 applies in a given case is a question of fact for the trial court, which is vested with broad latitude in making its determination.’ ” (People v. Ortiz (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1378.) “We must affirm if substantial evidence supports a trial court’s express or implied determination that punishment for crimes occurring during a course of conduct does not involve dual use of facts prohibited by section 654.” (People v. Palmore (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1290, 1297.) “ ‘We review the trial court’s determination in the light most favorable to the respondent and presume the existence of every fact the trial court could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the determination, and when two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions 2 for those of the trial court. If such substantial evidence be found, it is of no consequence that the trial court believing other evidence, or drawing other reasonable inferences, might have reached a contrary conclusion.’ ” (Ortiz, at p. 1378.) According to Martin, there is no evidence to suggest that he intended to burglarize any other property than the building he was caught burglarizing in this case, and thus, no substantial evidence supports a finding that the burglary and Martin’s possession of burglary tools were two discrete acts. In support of this contention, he cites People v. Castillo (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1020. There, the defendant was found in possession of a screwdriver immediately after burglarizing a residence where the “deadbolt lock on the kitchen back door had been removed and there were pry marks, consistent with those made with a screwdriver, on the deadbolt lock of the front door.” (Id. at p. 1022.) “The People . . .

Filed 6/25/25 P. v. Singleton CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THE PEOPLE, D085303 Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN440538) DAVID PALLERA SINGLETON, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Sim von Kalinowski, Judge. Affirmed. Laura Beth Arnold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. David Pallera Singleton appeals the judgment sentencing him to prison for 10 years after he pled guilty to attempted murder and admitted a firearm enhancement allegation. His appointed counsel filed a brief in which she raised no claims of error and invited us to review the record independently for error. (See People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) We have done so and found no error requiring reversal or modification of the judgment. We therefore affirm. BACKGROUND Singleton and Wyatt Laney were members of a motorcycle gang. Laney saw a member of a rival gang at a bar and contacted Singleton. Singleton met Laney outside the bar and acted as a lookout as Laney fired his handgun four times into the bar at the rival gang member. Laney missed his target. He and Singleton fled the scene in separate vehicles. The People charged Singleton with conspiracy to commit murder (Pen. Code, §§ 182, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a); subsequent undesignated section references are to this code), attempted murder (§§ 21a, 187, subd. (a)), and shooting at an occupied building (§ 246). They alleged gang and firearm enhancements (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C), (4)(B), (5), 12022, subd. (a)(1), 12022.53, subds. (c), (e)(1)) as to all charges, and also alleged Singleton had a prior conviction that qualified as a serious felony for purposes of a five-year enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and a strike under the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12) and served a prior prison term (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(3)). Singleton pled not guilty to all charges and denied all allegations. On the eve of trial, Singleton filed a motion for mental health diversion. (§ 1001.36.) The parties agreed the motion would be heard during trial, and the People later filed opposition to the motion. The jury was unable to reach any verdicts, and the court declared a mistrial. The court denied the motion for mental health diversion. Before a second trial began, the parties reached a plea agreement. Singleton agreed to plead guilty to attempted murder and to admit the attached gang and firearm enhancement allegations and the allegation of 2 service of a prior prison term. In exchange, the People agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and allegations. The parties stipulated to imposition of the upper prison term of nine years for attempted murder (§ 664, subd. (a)) plus a consecutive prison term of one year for the firearm enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)) and to striking the punishment for the gang enhancement (§ 1385, subd. (b)(1)). After reviewing the terms of the plea agreement with Singleton and his counsel and ensuring Singleton understood the trial-related constitutional rights he was waiving, the court found Singleton knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered into the plea agreement, accepted his guilty plea and admissions, and dismissed the remaining charges and allegations. At the sentencing hearing, the court imposed the stipulated 10-year prison term. It also imposed a $300 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(1)), a $300 parole revocation restitution fine (§ 1202.45, subd. (a)), a $40 court operations assessment (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)) and a $30 court facilities assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373, subd. (a)(1)). DISCUSSION Singleton’s appointed counsel filed a brief in which she summarized the proceedings, raised no claims of error, and asked us to review the record independently for error. (See Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 441 [appellate court must “conduct a review of the entire record whenever appointed counsel submits a brief which raises no specific issues”].) We advised Singleton he could file a supplemental brief, but he did not. We have reviewe

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN NO. 03-25-00293-CR Andres Alejandro Barragan, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee FROM THE 20TH DISTRICT COURT OF MILAM COUNTY NO. CR27,921, THE HONORABLE JOHN YOUNGBLOOD, JUDGE PRESIDING ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION PER CURIAM Appellant Andres Alejandro Barragan was convicted of sexual assault of a child and sentenced to twelve years’ confinement by the trial court. See Tex. Penal Code § 22.011(a)(2). Pursuant to a plea bargain, Barragan pleaded guilty, judicially confessed to the indicted offense, and waived his “right to appeal[,] including the right to appeal any decisions made by the Court in any and all pre-trial hearings.” In exchange, the parties agreed that the available sentencing range would be capped at fifteen years, and the State recommended that the trial court consider an unadjudicated charge of marijuana possession. See Tex. Penal Code § 12.45 (barring prosecution for unadjudicated offenses considered during sentencing hearing); Kennedy v. State, 297 S.W.3d 338, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (reaffirming that charge-bargaining constitutes plea bargain for purposes of Rule 25.2(a)(2)); Shankle v. State, 119 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (explaining that “[s]entence-bargaining may be for binding or non-binding recommendations to the court on sentences, including a recommended ‘cap’ on sentencing”); Threadgill v. State, 120 S.W.3d 871, 872 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (listing cases holding that “an agreement to a punishment cap is a plea agreement within the meaning of Rule 25.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure”). The State’s recommendation—signed by Barragan and his attorney—also contained a checked box next to the provision: “WAIVE ALL RIGHTS TO APPEAL, INCLUDING NOTICE OF APPEAL AND MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL. WITHDRAW ALL PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS.” The trial court accepted the plea bargain. The parties acknowledged the existence of the sentencing cap during the punishment hearing, and the judgment of conviction noted both the cap and the trial court’s consideration of the unadjudicated marijuana-possession charge. Barragan’s right to appeal was not addressed at the hearing. In its certification of Barragan’s right of appeal, the trial court certified that this is “a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal.” See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2 (requiring certification of defendant’s right of appeal). However, next to the certification, the trial judge wrote “sentencing guilt/innocence.” The judge did not check the box providing that this is “a plea-bargain case, but the trial court has given permission to appeal.” It is unclear from the record whether the trial court’s notation was intended to signify that the court had given Barragan permission to appeal and, if so, from what. Accordingly, we abate this appeal and remand the cause to the trial court for entry of an amended certification clarifying Barragan’s right of appeal. See Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 614–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (requiring court of appeals to obtain another certification when certification in record “is correct in form but . . . proves to be inaccurate”); Saldana v. State, 2 No. 03-17-00151-CR, 2017 WL 2856456, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin June 27, 2017, order) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (abating for clarification due to “conflicting information in the clerk’s record about [defendant]’s right to appeal”). The trial court is instructed to prepare and file with this Court an amended certification specifying whether this is a plea-bargain case for which Barragan has no right of appeal, whether he has waived his right of appeal, or whether the trial court has given him permission to appeal. If the trial court has given Barragan permission to appeal, it shall note the scope of the permission. The supplemental clerk’s record containing the amended certification shall be forwarded to this Court within fifteen days of the date reflected in this opinion. It is so ordered on June 20, 2025. Before Justices Triana, Theofanis, and Crump Abated and Remanded Filed: June 20, 2025 Do Not Publish 3

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-24-00525-CR Alfred Fabian FARIAS, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee From the County Court at Law No. 8, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 731783 Honorable Mary D. Roman, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice Sitting: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice Lori Massey Brissette, Justice H. Todd McCray, Justice Delivered and Filed: August 6, 2025 AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED In two issues, appellant Alfred Fabian Farias challenges the trial court’s judgment of conviction in cause number 731783. We modify the judgment to reflect Farias’s plea of not guilty and affirm the judgment as modified. BACKGROUND In April 2024, Farias was charged with the misdemeanor offense of making terroristic threats against Monica Ramirez. That charge was docketed under cause number 731782. In May  04-24-00525-CR 2024, Farias was again charged with making terroristic threats—this time against Daniel Ramirez—and that charge was docketed under cause number 731783. The trial court consolidated the two causes. In a single trial, a jury found Farias guilty as charged in both cases, and the trial court sentenced him to 86 days’ incarceration. Farias timely filed this appeal from the judgment in cause number 731783. 1 ANALYSIS Consolidation In his first issue, Farias argues the trial court erred by consolidating the charge at issue in this appeal with the separate charge that was pending in cause number 731782. The State responds that Farias consented to the consolidation by failing to object below. “A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all offenses arising out of the same criminal episode.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 3.02(a). “When a single criminal action is based on more than one charging instrument,” the charged offenses may be tried in a single action if the State files “written notice of the action not less than 30 days prior to the trial.” Id. § 3.02(b); Garza v. State, 687 S.W.2d 325, 330 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). Here, Farias correctly notes that although he was prosecuted on two separate charging instruments in a single trial, the appellate record does not contain any pre-trial written notice of consolidation. “It has long been held that pending indictments may be consolidated in a single trial with the consent [of] or absent an objection by and with the implied consent of the defendant.” Garza, 687 S.W.2d at 330; see also Milligan v. State, 764 S.W.2d 802, 803 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). The State’s failure to give proper notice of consolidation is a procedural error that the defendant can 1 Farias also appealed his conviction in cause number 731782. By separate opinion issued July 16, 2025, we affirmed that conviction. See Farias v. State, No. 04-24-00526-CR, 2025 WL 1949572, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 16, 2025, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). -2-  04-24-00525-CR waive by failing to object at trial. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.14(a); LaPorte v. State, 840 S.W.2d 412, 414–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), overruled in part on other grounds by Ex parte Carter, 521 S.W.3d 344, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); York v. State, 848 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1993, pet. ref’d). Here, immediately before jury selection, the trial court called both cases and told the venire panel that “those two cases have been consolidated.” The record does not show that Farias argued below that he had not received proper notice of consolidation. Nor did he otherwise object to consolidation or move to sever the two causes. Because Farias did not object to either the consolidation itself or to his purported lack of notice, he waived any complaint about that issue. Milligan, 764 S.W.2d at 803; York, 848 S.W.2d at 343. But even if we assume he preserved this error for our review, we see nothing in the record to support a conclusion that the consolidation affected his substantial rights. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Tovar v. State, 165 S.W.3d 785, 795 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, no pet.).

COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS SHAWN TYLER, § No. 08-24-00124-CR Appellant, § Appeal from the v. § 109th District Court THE STATE OF TEXAS, § of Andrews County, Texas Appellee. § (TC# 8301) MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Shawn Tyler, appeals the adjudication of his guilt. Tyler’s counsel filed a brief in compliance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). Finding no error, we affirm. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In September 2020, Tyler was the driver in a single-car accident that resulted in the death of one of his passengers. He was charged with manslaughter in an information that alleged that he recklessly cause[d] the death of . . . Crystal Tottress, by failing to maintain a single lane of traffic and control speed of the vehicle he was driving.” 1 Tyler ultimately pled guilty and the trial court deferred adjudication and placed him on community supervision for five years. 1 Tyler later waived his right to prosecution by an indictment and consented to prosecution by information. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.141. 1  Less than a year later, the State filed a motion to proceed with adjudication of guilt. It alleged that Tyler committed the following six violations of the terms of community supervision: 1. Arrested for fraudulent acts in Nevada (cheating while gambling) on July 30, 2023; 2. Tested positive for marijuana on or about March 14, 2023; 3. Tested positive for marijuana on or about August 10, 2023; 4. Left Andrews County without permission in June 2023; 5. Failed to perform 250 hours of community service; and 6. Failed to observe curfew. At the revocation hearing, Tyler pleaded true to the second, third, and sixth allegations (regarding marijuana use and violating curfew). The State put on two witnesses. Corina Whitehead, the director of the community supervision and corrections department, testified that Tyler should have completed 70 hours of community service by that point and had only completed 46. She also said that Tyler went to Lubbock without permission because of an emergency and, although he told her after he came back, he did not report it as soon as possible. Finally, Whitehead said that Tyler self-reported his violations, complied with their order that he take substance abuse classes, and had recently obtained a prescription for marijuana. She believed he would continue to communicate with the department if he were to remain on community supervision. The State’s second witness was Brandon Haase, an enforcement agent with the Nevada Gaming Control Board. Haase testified that he reviewed surveillance video of Tyler playing Blackjack. 2 Haase explained that the video showed Tyler “press” or “cap” his bet while playing Blackjack. He explained that pressing or capping a bet is adding a wager when one is not allowed by the rules of the game. Pressing a bet essentially increases a gambler’s odds of winning because the bet is made at a time when the gambler has more information about what cards he or others hold. Haase testified that when he questioned Tyler, Tyler told Haase that he did not understand the rules of Blackjack and did not know that adding to his bet was illegal. But Haase did not believe this excuse 2 Tyler obtained permission to go to Las Vegas, Nevada to attend a wedding. 2 because Tyler “palmed” the chips, indicating an intent to hide them from view. However, Haase also stated that the tape showed other instances where Tyler tried to increase wagers in plain view. At the conclusion of this phase, the trial court stated that in addition to the three allegations to which Tyler pleaded true, it found allegations one (fraudulent act offense) and four (leaving the county without permission) true by a preponderance of the evidence. It found allegation five (failure to perform community service) not true. During the punishment phase, the State called Trooper Michael Row to testify about his investigation of the prior manslaughter charges. Row recalled that Tyler admitted that night that he had been at a bar and had two beers and was “sipping off of another mixed drink.” However, Tyler’s blood alcoho