Dick B. Simmons, Sr., and Julie M. Simmons v. White Knight Development, LLC

30 June 4, 2025 No. 484 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON Richard GRIFFITH and Reta Griffith, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants Cross-Respondents, v. PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD, Defendant-Respondent Cross-Appellant, and ALPINE ABATEMENT ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendant. Wallowa County Circuit Court 22CV10452; A181951 Wes Williams, Judge. On appellants’ petition for reconsideration filed March 28, 2025, and respondent’s response filed April 2, 2025. Opinion filed March 19, 2025. 339 Or App 40, 566 P3d 1235 (2025). Kelly Vance for petition. Thomas M. Christ and Sussman Shank LLP for response. Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and Jacquot, Judge. TOOKEY, P. J. Reconsideration allowed; former opinion modified and adhered to as modified. Cite as 341 Or App 30 (2025) 31 TOOKEY, P. J. Plaintiffs petition for reconsideration of our deci- sion in Griffith v. Property and Casualty Ins. Co. of Hartford, 339 Or App 40, 566 P3d 1235 (2025), asserting, among other reasons that we should reconsider our decision, that we “committed factual error in opining that all plaintiffs’ counsel did was file a complaint, which was contrary to the evidence.” Plaintiffs assert that “the trial court file shows far more activity than is depicted by the panel’s opinion.” We grant reconsideration, modify our previous opinion in two respects, and adhere to it as modified. First, in our opinion, we stated, “The complaint and Hartford’s answer were the only filings relating to Hartford in plaintiffs’ civil action. Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs and Hartford executed a ‘Release and Settlement Agreement,’ under which the parties settled plaintiffs’ insurance and breach of contract claims ‘and all related controversies.’ ” Id. at 42. We modify those sentences to read, “After Vance filed the civil action, plaintiffs and Hartford executed a ‘Release and Settlement Agreement,’ under which the parties settled plaintiffs’ insurance and breach of contract claims ‘and all related controversies.’ ” Second, in our opinion, we stated, “Prior to the par- ties’ settlement and release, there was minimal litigation by plaintiffs’ counsel (the filing of a complaint) with respect to plaintiffs’ claims against Hartford.” Id. at 48. We mod- ify that sentence so that it reads, “Prior to the parties’ set- tlement and release, litigation by plaintiffs’ counsel with respect to plaintiffs’ claims against Hartford included fil- ing a complaint and amended complaint, filing a reply to Hartford’s affirmative defenses, filings related to summary judgment, and oral argument before the court.” We have also considered the other reasons that plaintiffs assert that we should reconsider our opinion and have determined that reconsideration is not warranted. Reconsideration allowed; former opinion modified and adhered to as modified.

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas 10-25-00156-CV TDJ Corporation d/b/a Infinity Nails, Tiffany Thuy Do and Don Kim Do, Appellants v. CBL RM-Waco, LLC, Appellee On appeal from the 74th District Court of McLennan County, Texas Judge Gary R. Coley, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 2021-3652-3 JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the Court. MEMORANDUM OPINION On June 11, 2025, the appellants, TDJ Corporation d/b/a Infinity Nails, Tiffany Thuy Do and Don Kim Do, filed a motion to dismiss this appeal because the parties have reached a settlement. The motion indicates that the appellants no longer desire to pursue the appeal due to the settlement which resolves all issues and disputes in the case.  The motion to dismiss the appeal is granted. Accordingly, pursuant to the written settlement agreement of the parties, this appeal is dismissed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(a). STEVE SMITH Justice OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: June 18, 2025 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Appeal dismissed CV06 TDJ Corporation v. CBL RM-Waco, LLC Page 2

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS CHAD ATHERTON and THADINE ARONOVICH, UNPUBLISHED also known as BRITT ARONOVICH, also known as June 03, 2025 BRITT THADINE ARONOVICH, 1:47 PM Plaintiffs-Appellants, v No. 368977 Kent Circuit Court JARRED SPER, SARA SPER, SUMMIT COURT LC No. 23-003012-CB HOLDINGS LLC, DREAMERS AND DOERS 3981 LLC, KYLE SISCHO, and DETACH LLC, Defendants-Appellees. Before: PATEL, P.J., and BOONSTRA and CAMERON, JJ. PER CURIAM. In this property dispute regarding a right of first refusal, plaintiffs appeal as of right the trial court’s order denying their motion for reconsideration, in part. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Defendants Jarred and Sara Sper (the Spers) owned a large tract of mostly undeveloped property in Rockford, Michigan. In 2017, plaintiffs bought a home and 10 acres of the property from the Spers. The purchase agreement included an addendum stating: “Buyers to have first right of refusal to purchase any additional land that the seller owns surrounding [plaintiffs’ property].” In the following years, plaintiffs and the Spers became friends and often socialized with each other. The parties sometimes had informal discussions about whether plaintiffs were interested in buying more of the Spers’ land, but plaintiffs believed the Spers’s asking price was too high. In 2022, the Spers executed a quitclaim deed for approximately 50 acres of their property— a portion of which was adjacent to plaintiffs’ property—to defendant Summit Court Holdings, LLC (Summit), for $0. Jarred was the sole voting member involved with Summit, and stated the -1- transfer was for liability purposes.1 The next week, Summit executed a memorandum of a land contract selling the 50-acre parcel to defendant Dreamers and Doers 3981, LLC (Dreamers and Doers), for $419,000—a price that was much lower than the price, per acre, the Spers previously discussed with plaintiffs. Jarred owned Dreamers and Doers in equal part with his brother, Stephen, and friend, defendant Kyle Sischo. The land contract included a lease agreement to allow defendant Detach, LLC (Detach) to operate a campground on the land, which had been a longtime goal of Dreamers and Doers’ members. When plaintiffs learned about the transfer after the fact, they filed suit for breach of contract. Plaintiffs sought specific performance or monetary damages, but emphasized that the most appropriate remedy was specific performance. After a bench trial, the trial court found the transaction did not trigger plaintiffs’ right of first refusal because it was not an “arm’s-length transaction.” The trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration. Plaintiffs now appeal. II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW “We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision on a motion for reconsideration.” Masrur v Regents of Univ of Mich, 344 Mich App 102, 110; 999 NW2d 55 (2022). “A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” Ickes v Korte, 331 Mich App 436, 440; 951 NW2d 699 (2020). A trial court also “necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.” Pirgu v United Servs Auto Ass’n, 499 Mich 269, 274; 884 NW2d 257 (2016). For cases concerning equitable relief, “an appellate court will set aside a trial court’s factual findings only if they are clearly erroneous, but whether equitable relief is proper under those facts is a question of law that appellate courts review de novo.” McDonald v Farm Bureau Ins Co, 460 Mich 191, 197; 747 NW2d 811 (2008). “Questions involving the proper interpretation of a contract or the legal effect of a contractual clause are also reviewed de novo.” Id. III. ANALYSIS Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred when it determined their right of first refusal was not triggered by Summit’s sale of the 50-acre parcel to Dreamers and Doers. We agree. “A right of first refusal, or preemptive right, is a conditional option to purchase dependent on the landowner’s desire to sell.” Randolph v Reisig, 272 Mich App 331, 336; 727 NW2d 388 (2006). It “empowers its holder with a preferential right to purchase property on the same terms offered by or to a bona fid