Franklin v. Genesee, County of

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 GAMALIEL ELIZALDE, Case No. 25-cv-02683-WHO (PR) Plaintiff, 8 ORDER OF DISMISSAL v. 9 10 CONTRA COSTA ADULT SCHOOL PROGRAM, et al., 11 Defendants. 12 13 INTRODUCTION 14 Plaintiff Gamaliel Elizalde alleges that an adult school teacher deprived him of 15 academic credits he had earned, thereby adversely affecting his parole suitability in which 16 he has a protected due process interest. His 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint containing these 17 allegations is now before me for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 18 This federal civil rights action is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim for relief. 19 Even if there were a cause of action for unlawful interference with parole suitability, no 20 claim would lie on the facts presented here. Elizalde admits that the deprived credits were 21 restored. Also, a claim that the teacher interfered with his liberty interest in parole is too 22 speculative. He is not eligible for parole until 2028 or 2029 and parole decisions are based 23 on many factors, with the completion of school courses being only one such factor. 24 DISCUSSION 25 A. Standard of Review 26 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a 27 prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 1 cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim 2 upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 3 from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. 4 See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 5 A “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 6 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 7 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial 8 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 9 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting 10 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Furthermore, a court “is not required to accept legal 11 conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably 12 be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754–55 13 (9th Cir. 1994). 14 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 15 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 16 violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 17 color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 18 B. Legal Claims 19 Elizalde alleges that in 2023 he took classes at the Martinez Detention Facility with 20 Eve, a teacher employed by the Contra Costa Adult School Program, to increase his parole 21 suitability. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1 at 3-4.) He alleges that Eve took away or failed to give 22 him the academic credits he earned through his coursework. (Id. at 9-11.) However, he 23 admits that those same credits were later restored. (Id. at 11-12.) Elizalde states that his 24 next parole eligibility hearing will not be held until 2028 or 2029. (Id. at 3.) 25 Elizalde’s allegations that Eve unlawfully interfered with his due process right to 26 parole fail to state a claim for relief. Even if suc

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA ROBERT CAULEY, Case No. 2:25-cv-05539-SB-BFM Plaintiff, v. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE SHARLIZE JON LLC, Defendant. Plaintiff Robert Cauley, who requires the use of a wheelchair while traveling in public, filed this suit alleging that Defendant’s facilities impose physical barriers that impede his access, in violation of, inter alia, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Unruh Act. Dkt. No. 1. Because Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim is closely related to his ADA claim, the Court has authority to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However, supplemental jurisdiction “is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s right,” and district courts “can decline to exercise jurisdiction over pendent claims for a number of valid reasons.” City of Chi. v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This discretion is codified in § 1367(c): The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if— (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). In a published decision, the Ninth Circuit explained that the California Legislature’s 2012 and 2015 amendments to the Unruh Act, which were intended to protect businesses from abusive litigation by high-frequency litigants bringing construction-related claims, had led to a surge of filings in federal courts of ADA cases seeking statutory damages under the Unruh Act. Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202 (9th Cir. 2021). The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that this shift in filings from state courts to federal courts had circumvented the state legislature’s goals and “rendered [the new statutory requirements] largely toothless, because they can now be readily evaded.” Id. at 1213. The court explained that “retention of supplemental jurisdiction over ADA-based Unruh Act claims threatens to substantially thwart California’s carefully crafted reforms in this area and to deprive the state courts of their critical role in effectuating the policies underlying those reforms.” Id. Thus, the court held that these circumstances are “exceptional” within the meaning of § 1367(c)(4) and therefore potentially justified declining supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim. See id. (“The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that this extraordinary situation threatens unusually significant damage to federal-state comity and presents ‘exceptional circumstances’ within the meaning of § 1367(c)(4).”). However, because the district court had waited to decline supplemental jurisdiction until after granting summary judgment on the plaintiff’s ADA claim, thereby effectively deciding the Unruh Act claim, the Ninth Circuit reversed the court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction, holding that it had waited too long to invoke the comity interest. Id. at 1215–17. Unlike Arroyo, this case is still at a very early stage, and this Court has not yet addressed or adjudicated the merits of any of Plaintiff’s claims. This appears to be a case in which the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim under § 1367(c)(4) to protect the comity interests identified in Arroyo. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS Plaintiff within 14 days after entry of this Order to show cause in writing why the Court should not dismiss without prejudice his Unruh Act claim under § 1367(c)(4). Plaintiff’s response must identify the amount of statutory damages Plaintiff seeks to recover and must be supported by declarations, signed under penalty of perjury, providing all facts necessary for the Court to determine if Plaintiff and his counsel satisfy the definition of a “high-frequency litigant” as provided by Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.55(b)(1)–(2). If Plaintiff fails to file a respons

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 8 9 NESTOR ALONZO HERNANDEZ- GONZALEZ, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-00351-TMC-GJL 10 Petitioner, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 11 v. Noting Date: June 13, 2025 12 PAMELA BONDI, et al., Respondents. 13 14 Petitioner Nestor Alonzo Hernandez-Gonzalez initiated this 28 U.S.C. § 2241 15 immigration habeas action on February 25, 2025, to obtain his release from immigration 16 detention. Dkt. 1. Petitioner is proceeding with counsel. See Dkt. 8. The Government has 17 subsequently filed a Notice of Change in Custody Status informing the Court of Petitioner’s 18 April 4, 2025, removal from the United States along with a corresponding Motion to Dismiss for 19 Mootness. Dkt. 11. Because this action no longer involves a live controversy for adjudication, 20 the undersigned recommends the Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 11) be GRANTED and the Petition 21 (Dkt. 1) be DISMISSED without prejudice. 22 Under Article III of the United States Constitution, federal courts may adjudicate only 23 actual, ongoing cases or controversies. Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 199 (1988). “For a 24 habeas petition to continue to present a live controversy after the petitioner’s release or 1 deportation . . . there must be some remaining ‘collateral consequence’ that may be redressed by 2 success on the petition.” Abdala v. I.N.S., 488 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2007). Here, Petitioner 3 sought only his release from detention, so his claims have been fully resolved. See Dkts. 1, 11. 4 Accordingly, there is no collateral consequence remaining to be redressed by the Court and the 5 Petition should be dismissed as moot. See id. 6 Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the Government’s Motion to Dismiss 7 (Dkt. 11) be GRANTED and this action be DISMISSED without prejudice. No certificate of 8 appealability shall issue. 9 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), the parties 10 shall have fourteen (14) days from service of this report to file written objections. See also Fed. 11 R. Civ. P. 6. Failure to file objections will result in a waiver of those objections for purposes of 12 de novo review by the district judge, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), and can result in a waiver of 13 those objections for purposes of appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 142 (1985); Miranda 14 v. Anchondo, 684 F.3d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Accommodating the time 15 limit imposed by Rule 72(b), the Clerk is directed to set the matter for consideration on June 13, 16 2025, as noted in the caption. 17 18 Dated this 29th day of May, 2025. 19 A 20 Grady J. Leupold 21 United States Magistrate Judge 22 23 24