Latonya Burton v. West Virginia Division of Corrections and John and Jane Does

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS DEBRA B. FORD, UNPUBLISHED June 20, 2025 Plaintiff-Appellant, 12:09 PM v No. 371805 Calhoun Circuit Court CITY OF MARSHALL, BAILEY EXCAVATING, LC No. 2020-000348-NO INC., LIBERTA CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, doing business as CIOFFI & SON CONSTRUCTION, and GIVE-EM A BRAKE SAFETY, LLC, Defendants, and CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and REDFORD and MARIANI, JJ. BOONSTRA, P.J. (concurring). I fully concur in the majority opinion. I write separately to offer additional reasons to affirm the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant Consumers Energy Company. Plaintiff continues to advance the argument that her claim against Consumers sounded in ordinary negligence. But whether plaintiff’s claim sounds in negligence or in premises liability is determined by considering the plaintiff's complaint as a whole, regardless of the labels attached to the allegations by the plaintiff. Jeffrey-Moise v Williamsburg Towne Houses Coop, Inc, 336 Mich App 616, 625; 971 NW2d 716 (2012).. And the nature of a claim (as either premises liability or ordinary negligence) is generally determined by the nature of the hazard itself. As we held in Ford -1- v City of Marshall, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued January 13, 2022 (Docket No. 355541) (Ford I), p 4: On appeal, plaintiff argues that her claim sounded in ordinary negligence rather than premises liability because Consumers lacked possession and control of the sidewalk on the date of plaintiff’s injuries. Plaintiff’s argument lacks merit. As already noted, the question of whether a claim sounds in premises liability or ordinary negligence hinges on the nature of the hazard. Buhalis, 296 Mich App at 692.[1] . . . [W]hether Consumers had possession and control of the sidewalk had no bearing on the nature of plaintiff’s claim, i.e., whether it sounded in ordinary negligence or premises liability. This Court has held that, in certain situations, a contractor whose negligent workmanship creates a hazardous condition on the land may be held liable not only to its contractee, but also in negligence to third parties who later incur foreseeable harm upon encountering the hazard. See Kapalczynski v Globe Construction Co, 19 Mich App 396, 403 n 10; 172 NW2d 852 (1969) (citing 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 385, p 293); Feaster v Hous, 137 Mich App 783, 789; 359 NW2d 219 (1984). This potential for liability arises after the contracted-for work has been completed and accepted by the premises possessor, and is based on the contractor’s negligent performance of a contractual duty. See Feaster, 137 Mich App at 789. By contrast, contractors who are currently engaged in contractual duties with respect to the land on behalf of the premises possessor/owner are “subject to the same liability, and enjoy[] the same freedom from liability, as though [they] were the possessor[s] of the land . . . .” Finazzo v Fire Equipment Co, 323 Mich App 620, 626; 918 NW2d 200 (2018).2 Effectively, the premises possessor has “loaned” possessory rights to the contractor. Id. at 627-628, citing Orel v Uni-Rak Sales, Co, Inc, 454 Mich 564, 567 n 2; 563 NW2d 241 (1997) and Quinlivan v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, Inc, 395 Mich 244, 269; 235 NW2d 732 (1972) (“This ‘loaning’ gives a quantum of ‘control and possession’ to another party.”). This Court in Finazzo noted that “our Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the principles underlying the rule set forth in 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, §384, p 289,” which provides: One who on behalf of the possessor of land erects a structure or creates any other condition on the land is subject to the same liability, and enjoys the same freedom from liability, as though he were the possessor of the land, for physical harm caused to others upon and outside of the land by the dangerous character of the structure 1 Buhalis held that “If the plaintiff’s injury arose from an allegedly dangerous condition on the land, the action sounds in premises liability rather than ordinary negligence; this is true even when the plaintiff alleges that the premises possessor created the condition giving rise to the pla

No. 542 June 11, 2025 307 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of S. P., a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness. STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. S. P., Appellant. Lane County Circuit Court 24CC03731; A184975 Stephen W. Morgan, Judge. Submitted May 12, 2025. Christopher J. O’Connor and Multnomah Defenders, Inc., filed the brief for appellant. Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Rolf C. Moan, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Joyce, Judge. PER CURIAM Affirmed. State v. E. K. C., 337 Or App 362, 562 P3d 1139 (2025).

No. 533 June 11, 2025 283 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON Jill BONG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. OREGON DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE and Oregon Attorney General, Defendants-Respondents. Douglas County Circuit Court 23CV45434; A185121 Jason R. Thomas, Judge. Submitted May 12, 2025. Jill Bong filed the briefs pro se. Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Denise G. Fjordbeck, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondents. Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Joyce, Judge. AOYAGI, P. J. Affirmed. 284 Bong v. Dept. of Justice AOYAGI, P. J. In March 2023, petitioner filed a federal action that included claims against the former governor of Oregon and the former director of the Oregon Health Authority (OHA) in their individual and official capacities. A senior assistant attorney general (AAG) from the Oregon Department of Justice (DOJ) appeared on behalf of the former governor and the former OHA director in both their individual and official capacities. Petitioner challenged the AAG’s authority to appear for the defendants in their individual capacities. The federal court rejected that challenge. Petitioner then filed this state court action against the Oregon Attorney General and the DOJ, challenging their authority to defend former or current state officials, officers, or employees in their personal capacities in specified circumstances. The circuit court held a stipulated facts trial and ultimately dismissed the case on two grounds: (1) that petitioner lacked standing to object to what lawyer rep- resents her opponents in court, for reasons detailed at length in the court’s letter opinion, and (2) that any complaint about the qualifications or status of another party’s lawyer should be directed to the court in which that lawyer is appearing— here, to the federal court, which had already rejected petition- er’s challenge to the AAG’s representation—rather than being raised in a separate action in a different court. On appeal, petitioner contends that the circuit court erred in dismissing her state court action. In five assign- ments of error, she challenges the court’s ruling, arguing that she has standing, that the court misframed the issue, that the court improperly resurrected a waived claim-splitting defense, that the court’s second basis for dismissal was wrong, and that the court had authority to issue an injunc- tion in this case. The state responds that the circuit court properly dismissed the case, because petitioner met none of the elements of standing, and because the circuit court could not be required to direct proceedings in a federal dis- trict court as petitioner sought. Having reviewed the record and considered the parties’ arguments, we agree with the state that the trial court did not err in dismissing the action. Petitioner failed Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 283 (2025) 285 to establish standing, which is dispositive. Accordingly, we affirm. Affirmed.

No. 566 June 25, 2025 449 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON L. B. B., Petitioner-Respondent, v. DAVID WHITE, Respondent-Appellant. Washington County Circuit Court 23PO09210; A182481 Kelly D. Lemarr, Judge. Submitted May 20, 2025. David White filed the brief pro se. No appearance for respondent. Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Hellman, Judge, and O’Connor, Judge. ORTEGA, P. J. Appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 450 L. B. B. v. White ORTEGA, P. J. Respondent appeals an order denying his motion to stay the trial court’s previous order granting an extreme risk protection order under ORS 166.527. The court’s order deny- ing respondent’s motion to stay in the context of this special statutory proceeding was not an appealable order because it did not affect a substantial right within the meaning of ORS 19.205(5). Thus, we do not reach the merits of respondent’s various arguments and dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

11TH COURT OF APPEALS EASTLAND, TEXAS JUDGMENT Carol Johnene Morris, * From the 238th District Court of Midland County, Trial Court No. CV59879. Vs. No. 11-23-00190-CV * August 7, 2025 City of Midland, Texas; * Memorandum Opinion by Bailey, C.J. J.M. Cox Resources; (Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., and I.C.E.E.D., Inc., Trotter, J., and Wright, S.C.J., sitting by assignment) (Williams, J., not participating) This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there is no error in the judgment below. Therefore, in accordance with this court’s opinion, the judgment of the trial court is in all things affirmed.