Legal Case

Epic Systems Corporation v. Tata Consultancy Services Limited

Court

Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided

June 10, 2025

Jurisdiction

F

Importance

48%

Significant

Practice Areas

Civil Litigation
Intellectual Property Law

Case Summary

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-2882 EPIC SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TATA CONSULTANCY SERVICES LIMITED and TATA AMERICA INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Defendants-Appellees. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. No. 14-cv-748-wmc — William M. Conley, Judge. ____________________ ARGUED MAY 29, 2025 — DECIDED JUNE 4, 2025 ____________________ Before EASTERBROOK, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. A jury concluded that Tata Consultancy Services must pay Epic Systems $940 million: $240 million as compensation for the unauthorized use of con- fidential information and $700 million as punitive damages. After reducing the compensatory award to $140 million and the punitive award to $280 million, the district court entered 2 No. 24-2882 judgment on October 3, 2017. We affirmed the compensatory damages but held that the Constitution limits the punitive award to $140 million. 980 F.3d 1117 (7th Cir. 2020). On re- mand the district court denied Tata’s request to reduce puni- tive damages below $140 million. It entered a new judgment for a total of $280 million on July 12, 2022. We affirmed, con- cluding that Tata’s brazen and outrageous misconduct—steal- ing commercially valuable information and trying to prevent the theft’s discovery—justifies punitive damages of $140 mil- lion. No. 22-2420 (7th Cir. July 14, 2023) (nonprecedential dis- position). That did not end the dispute, however. Tata agreed to pay postjudgment interest on the compensatory damages from the 2017 judgment but insisted that postjudgment interest on punitive damages should run only from the 2022 judgment. About $6 million turns on the difference. The district court sided with Tata, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171708 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 23, 2024), and Epic appealed. The controlling statute is 28 U.S.C. §1961(a), which pro- vides: “Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court.” The time at which postjudgment interest begins to run thus depends on the date of a “money judgment … recovered in a district court.” What happens when multiple judgments are recovered in the same case? Here there are two, one in 2017 and the other in 2022. The statute does not choose. An amount provided in the first judgment and removed from the second cannot be the basis of interest. So the Supreme Court held in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 836 (1990). But both the 2017 judgment and the 2022 judgment award $140 million No. 24-2882 3 in compensatory damages plus at least $140 million in puni- tive damages. Our 2020 opinion vacated the judgment and remanded, but we did not disapprove either the compensatory damages or the first $140 million of the punitive award. Long ago the Supreme Court said, when interpreting a predecessor to §1961(a), that “[t]he rights of parties are not to be sacrificed to the mere leier, and whether the language used was reversed, modified, or affirmed in part and reversed in part, is immate- rial. Equity looks beyond these words of description to see what was in fact ordered to be done.” Kneeland v. American Loan & Trust Co., 138 U.S. 509, 512 (1891). None of the modest changes to what is now §1961(a) produced by its recodifica- tion in 1948, and later amendments to alter the rate of interest, calls Kneeland’s approach into question. “[W]hat was in fact … done” in 2020 was to block any punitive award in excess of $140 million. The difference between vacatur and reentry, on the one hand, and modifying the 2017 judgment, on the other, is not material to the parties’ entitlements. Still, our 2020 opinion did not hold that a punitive award of $140 million is compulsory. It was possible that the district judge would reduce it on remand. Possible yes, probable no. The jury awarded Epic $700 mil- lion in punitive damages. The reason the judge cut the award to $280 million was a state law in Wisconsin that caps punitive damages at double the compensatory award. Wis. Stat. §895.043(6). (Epic’s claims rest on state law.) Seiing the judg- ment at the statutory maximum is inconsistent with a belief by the district judge that the award should be lower, let alone that the award should be less than half of the statutory cap. It was no surprise, therefore, when the district judge on remand 4 No. 24-2882 fixed punitive damages at $140 million, the maximum amount that this court held to be constitutionally permissible,

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Case Details

Case Details

Legal case information

Status

Decided

Date Decided

June 10, 2025

Jurisdiction

F

Court Type

appellate

Legal Significance

Case importance metrics

Importance Score
Significant
Score48%
Citations
0
Legal Topics
Postjudgment Interest
Punitive Damages
Judgment Enforcement

Metadata

Additional information

AddedJun 10, 2025
UpdatedJun 10, 2025

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Legal Topics

Areas of law covered in this case

Postjudgment Interest
Punitive Damages
Judgment Enforcement

Case Information

Detailed case metadata and classifications

Court Proceedings

Date FiledJune 10, 2025
Date DecidedJune 10, 2025

Document Details

Times Cited
0
Importance Score
0.5

Legal Classification

JurisdictionF
Court Type
appellate
Judicial Panel
Easterbrook
Opinion Author
Easterbrook

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Becker v. Tig Insurance Company

80% match
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jun 2025

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 9 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MATTHEW BECKER; LAUREN No. 24-443 KUEHNE; ADAM CRISWELL; D.C. No. KRYSTAL CRISWELL; ALFEE DIXON; 3:21-cv-05185-JHC DONALD FINISTER Sr.; CHRISTOPHER HART; JASON KOVACK; RICKY LORENSIUS; HEATHER MAREK; MEMORANDUM* MICHAEL MARTIN; DAISEY MARTINEAR; GRACE MATEIAK; IAN MATEIAK; JOHN MELOPRIETO; TRAVIS NEUMAN; Doctor ARIEL NEUMAN; MICHELLE PAULINO; JOHN PAULINO; JAMES RAMPONI; LINDSEY RAMPONI; ERIC MCCANDLESS; PAIGE ROE; PAUL ROHRER; ANDREW SICAT; NICOYA SICAT; IAN LAUGHLIN; SHELLY LAUGHLIN; TAMMARA BOYLES; BOBBY BOYLES; LAIN SUPE; PETER BROWN; JEREMY SIERRA; ERICA SIERRA; DARIUS USMAN; KRISTEN ZABAGLO; DAVID WILSON, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. TIG INSURANCE COMPANY; UNITED SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign insurer, * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington John H. Chun, District Judge, Presiding Submitted June 5, 2025** Seattle, Washington Before: HAWKINS, GOULD, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges. Appellants (“Homeowners”) appeal the dismissal of their case with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 41(b) and several interlocutory rulings. We affirm the dismissal and do not consider Homeowners’ other claims because the dismissal was proper, foreclosing review of interlocutory rulings. A dismissal under Rule 41(b) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Al- Torki v. Kaempen, 78 F.3d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir.1996). “The trial court's dismissal will only be disturbed if there is a definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 640-41 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). This court weighs five factors to decide whether dismissal for failure to ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 2 24-443 prosecute or comply with a court order is proper. Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir. 1998). They are: “(1) the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” Id. There must be “unreasonable delay” before dismissal is proper. In re Eisen, 31 F.3d 1447, 1451 (9th Cir.1994). “A reviewing court will give deference to the district court to decide what is unreasonable because it is in the best position to determine what period of delay can be endured before its docket becomes unmanageable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Homeowners’ action. The district judge made detailed findings regarding each factor. Because the facts are familiar to the parties, we reference them only as they are relevant to the decision. The first factor—the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation— strongly favored dismissal. Homeowners exhibited a pattern of noncompliance with deadlines. Failure to comply with the court’s orders or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides grounds for dismissal under Rule 41(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Homeowners argue that they missed these deadlines in good faith, but a showing of bad faith is not required under the court’s inherent power to dismiss for lack of 3 24-443 prosecution under Rule 41(b). See Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1425 (9th Cir. 1986). The second factor—the district court’s need to manage its docket—also strongly favored dismissal. Plaintiffs’ repeated failures to meet deadlines undermined efficient management of the district court’s docket. See Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642. The third factor—the risk of prejudice to Appellee TIG Insurance Company (“TIG”)—also strongly favored dismissal. TIG suffered prejudice because Homeowners interfered with

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