State v. Walsh
Walsh
Citation
373 Or. 714
Court
Oregon Supreme Court
Decided
June 5, 2025
Jurisdiction
S
Importance
54%
Case Summary
714 June 5, 2025 No. 22 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Petitioner on Review, v. JAMES CLARE WALSH IV, Respondent on Review. (CC 20CR11620) (CA A178543) (SC S070940) En Banc On review from the Court of Appeals.* Argued and submitted January 9, 2025. Christopher A. Perdue, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review. Also on the briefs were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General. Anne Fujita Munsey, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. Also on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section. BUSHONG, J. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judg- ment of the circuit court is affirmed. ______________ * Appeal from Clackamas County Circuit Court, Ulanda Watkins, Judge. 330 Or App 617 (2024) (nonprecedential memorandum opinion). Cite as 373 Or 714 (2025) 715 716 State v. Walsh BUSHONG, J. This criminal case requires us to determine the consequences of a dispute over a stipulation in a plea agree- ment that the court “may impose” consecutive sentences on two charges. At sentencing, defendant contended that Oregon law precluded the trial court from imposing consec- utive sentences, because it had not made the findings that are ordinarily required by ORS 137.123(5) for consecutive sentences.1 The state disagreed, contending that defen- dant’s stipulation that the court “may impose” consecutive sentences meant that the court could do so without making the statutory findings. That triggered a discussion between counsel and the court about the effect of the “may impose” provision and whether the parties had reached a binding plea agreement. After that discussion, defendant withdrew his legal argument and affirmed that he was stipulating that the court could impose consecutive sentences without making the statutory findings. The court then proceeded to sentence defendant on two counts—imposing consecutive sentences on those counts without making the statutory findings—and dismissing the remaining counts. Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that “nothing in the plea agreement” prevented defendant from arguing that consecutive sen- tences were legally impermissible absent the required statu- tory findings, and that the trial court had erred “in conclud- ing that the parties had not reached a plea agreement[.]” State v. Walsh, 330 Or App 617, 619 (2024) (nonprecedential memorandum opinion). We allowed the state’s petition for review and now reverse the Court of Appeals. As we will explain, although the plea agreement did not mention the statutory findings required for consecutive sentences and can therefore be understood as defendant contended at sentencing, its statement that the court “may impose” consecutive sentences also can plausibly be read to mean that the court had the legal authority to impose 1 As discussed later in this opinion, where a defendant is convicted of multi- ple offenses arising out of a continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct, the court may impose consecutive sentences only if it makes the findings required by ORS 137.123(5). The parties do not dispute that defendant’s convictions here arose out of a continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct. Cite as 373 Or 714 (2025) 717 consecutive sentences without making those findings, as the state contends. The issue here is whether the trial court erred in how it addressed that ambiguity under the cir- cumstances of this case. As explained below, those circum- stances include the court’s statement that, if the parties did not resolve their dispute, it would treat the plea as with- drawn and return the case to the trial docket. Defendant did not object to that statement or argue that it was errone- ous. Instead, defendant decided to withdraw his argument that the trial court could impose consecutive sentences only if the court made the findings required by ORS 137.123(5), and he affirmed that he wished to proceed to sentencing. We conclude that, under those circumstances, the trial court did not err in how it handled the situation when confronted with the ambiguous plea agreement at sentenc- ing. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court. I. BACKGROUND The facts are procedural and taken from the trial court record. Defendant was charged by indictment with four Measure 11 offenses: one count
Case Details
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Status
Decided
Date Decided
June 5, 2025
Jurisdiction
S
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federal
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714 June 5, 2025 No. 22
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
JAMES CLARE WALSH IV,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 20CR11620) (CA A178543) (SC S070940)
En Banc On review from the Court of Appeals.* Argued and submitted January 9, 2025. Christopher A. Perdue, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review. Also on the briefs were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General. Anne Fujita Munsey, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. Also on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section. BUSHONG, J. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judg- ment of the circuit court is affirmed.
* Appeal from Clackamas County Circuit Court, Ulanda Watkins, Judge.
330 Or App 617 (2024) (nonprecedential memorandum opinion). Cite as 373 Or 714 (2025) 715 716 State v. Walsh
BUSHONG, J.
This criminal case requires us to determine the
consequences of a dispute over a stipulation in a plea agree- ment that the court “may impose” consecutive sentences on two charges. At sentencing, defendant contended that Oregon law precluded the trial court from imposing consec- utive sentences, because it had not made the findings that are ordinarily required by ORS 137.123(5) for consecutive sentences.1 The state disagreed, contending that defen- dant’s stipulation that the court “may impose” consecutive sentences meant that the court could do so without making the statutory findings. That triggered a discussion between counsel and the court about the effect of the “may impose” provision and whether the parties had reached a binding plea agreement. After that discussion, defendant withdrew his legal argument and affirmed that he was stipulating that the court could impose consecutive sentences without making the statutory findings. The court then proceeded to sentence defendant on two counts—imposing consecutive sentences on those counts without making the statutory findings—and dismissing the remaining counts. Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that “nothing in the plea agreement” prevented defendant from arguing that consecutive sen- tences were legally impermissible absent the required statu- tory findings, and that the trial court had erred “in conclud- ing that the parties had not reached a plea agreement[.]” State v. Walsh, 330 Or App 617, 619 (2024) (nonprecedential memorandum opinion). We allowed the state’s petition for review and now reverse the Court of Appeals. As we will explain, although the plea agreement did not mention the statutory findings required for consecutive sentences and can therefore be understood as defendant contended at sentencing, its statement that the court “may impose” consecutive sentences also can plausibly be read to mean that the court had the legal authority to impose 1 As discussed later in this opinion, where a defendant is convicted of multi- ple offenses arising out of a continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct, the court may impose consecutive sentences only if it makes the findings required by ORS 137.123(5). The parties do not dispute that defendant’s convictions here arose out of a continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct. Cite as 373 Or 714 (2025) 717
consecutive sentences without making those findings, as the state contends. The issue here is whether the trial court erred in how it addressed that ambiguity under the cir- cumstances of this case. As explained below, those circum- stances include the court’s statement that, if the parties did not resolve their dispute, it would treat the plea as with- drawn and return the case to the trial docket. Defendant did not object to that statement or argue that it was errone- ous. Instead, defendant decided to withdraw his argument that the trial court could impose consecutive sentences only if the court made the findings required by ORS 137.123(5), and he affirmed that he wished to proceed to sentencing. We conclude that, under those circumstances, the trial court did not err in how it handled the situation when confronted with the ambiguous plea agreement at sentenc- ing. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court. I. BACKGROUND The facts are procedural and taken from the trial court record. Defendant was charged by indictment with four Measure 11 offenses: one count
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Status
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Date Decided
June 5, 2025
Jurisdiction
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federal
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