Marseth Luvene v. Pro Carpentry LLC

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS MARSETH LUVENE, UNPUBLISHED June 17, 2025 Plaintiff-Appellant, 11:14 AM v No. 368385 Wayne Circuit Court PRO CARPENTRY, LLC, LC No. 21-009437-CD Defendant-Appellee. Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and O’BRIEN and ACKERMAN, JJ. PER CURIAM. In this action brought under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq., plaintiff appeals by right the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY This case arises out of defendant’s decision to terminate plaintiff, which plaintiff claims was because of his race. Defendant is a carpentry company. In September 2020, defendant hired plaintiff to work as a carpenter. Upon applying for the position, plaintiff signed an “Independent Contractor Worksheet” that noted his status as an independent contractor. Plaintiff, who is an African-American man, testified that he was subject to repeated instances of racism while working for defendant. Among these incidents, he alleged that his coworkers used racial slurs. On one occasion, plaintiff’s coworker, Caleb Farrar, directed a racial slur at plaintiff, which led to an altercation between the two men. Plaintiff also testified that he found a wooden cutout of black male genitalia nailed above a garage he was working on. Plaintiff claimed he reported the discriminatory incidents to his supervisor, Nicholas Young, who worked as a foreman for defendant. In November 2020, one of plaintiff’s coworkers, Joshua Supardi, overdosed on drugs while at the jobsite. Farrar, who was with Supardi at the time, reported that plaintiff supplied the drugs; however, plaintiff denied any involvement with the incident. David McGee, a co-owner of the company, terminated plaintiff the same day. Plaintiff believed he was terminated because of his -1- complaints of race discrimination. Defendant, however, maintained that plaintiff was terminated because he was consistently tardy, previously engaged in violence on the jobsite, and refused to cooperate with the investigation concerning the overdose. In August 2021, plaintiff filed a complaint raising race-based claims under ELCRA, including employment discrimination, a hostile work environment, and retaliation. As an alternative to his employment-discrimination claim, plaintiff also alleged a claim for discriminatory denial of a place of public accommodation. Defendant filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10), arguing that plaintiff could not assert claims under ELCRA because he was not an employee of defendant, and that plaintiff’s claims substantively failed. Following a hearing on defendant’s motion for summary disposition, the trial court applied the economic-reality test and found that defendant and plaintiff lacked an employer-employee relationship because plaintiff was an independent contractor. Therefore, plaintiff was not entitled to protection under ELCRA. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), and declined to rule on plaintiff’s substantive ELCRA claims. Plaintiff subsequently moved for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. Plaintiff now appeals the trial court’s grant of summary disposition. II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Chisholm v State Police, 347 Mich App 646, 651-652; 16 NW3d 563 (2023). “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim based on the factual allegations in the complaint. When considering such a motion, a trial court must accept all factual allegations as true, deciding the motion on the pleadings alone.” El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159- 160; 934 NW2d 665 (2019) (citations omitted). Although the trial court stated it was granting summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), it looked beyond the pleadings and based its decision on documentary evidence and deposition testimony that was not made part of the record until defendant filed its motion for summary disposition. Because the trial court looked beyond the pleadings when granting