Juan Arias v. Alma Sosa

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAOT-XX-XXXXXXX 20-JUN-2025 07:59 AM Dkt. 5 ODSLJ NO. CAOT-XX-XXXXXXX IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF HAWAI I JASON FLETCHER, Petitioner, v STATE OF HAWAI I, Respondent. ORDER (By: Leonard, Acting Chief Judge, Hiraoka, Wadsworth, JJ.) Upon review of the record, the court finds that self- represented Petitioner Eric Fletcher's (Fletcher) April 25, 2025 Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody appears to seek affirmative relief in the nature of a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus, which this court lacks jurisdiction to decide. Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that case No. CAOT-XX-XXXXXXX is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice to Fletcher seeking relief from the appropriate court having jurisdiction. Dated: Honolulu, Hawai i June 20, 2025. /s/ Katherine G. Leonard Acting Chief Judge /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka Associate Judge /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth Associate Judge

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX 20-JUN-2025 07:58 AM Dkt. 63 SO NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I MERVINA KAUKINI MAMO CASH-KAEO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GUY K. BARRETT; RONETTE BARRETT, Defendants-Appellants, DUSTIN K. BARRETT; SHEENA ANN BARRETT; RICHARD BARRETT; LEZLEY K. BARRETT aka LEZLEY BRADBURY, Defendants-Appellees, and JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10; DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10; and DOE ENTITIES 1-10, Defendants APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT WAI‘ANAE DIVISION (CASE NO. 1DRC-XX-XXXXXXX) SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER (By: Hiraoka, Presiding Judge, Nakasone and Guidry, JJ.) Defendants-Appellants Guy K. Barrett and Ronette Barrett (collectively, the Barretts) appeal from the District Court of the First Circuit's (district court)1 May 17, 2022 Judgment for Possession. They raise three points of error, contending that the district court abused its discretion when: 1 The Honorable Darolyn H. Lendio entered the Judgment for Possession. The Honorable Michelle N. Comeau presided over the April 26, 2022 hearing on Plaintiff-Appellee Mervina Kaukini Mamo Cash-Kaeo's (Cash- Kaeo) motion for summary judgment (MSJ).  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER (1) "it defaulted [the Barretts] for [their] non[-]appearance [at the MSJ hearing] where the facts show [the Barretts had] defended themselves in this action by retaining counsel" who "made eight court appearances at hearings in defense of [the Barretts]"; (2) "it applied the extreme sanctions methodology" by entering default judgment against the Barretts "for the failure of their counsel to appear at the hearing on [Cash- Kaeo's] [MSJ]"; and (3) "it allowed the hearing on [Cash-Kaeo's] [MSJ] to proceed without first addressing [counsel's] non[- ]appearance at this hearing." Upon careful review of the record and the briefs submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we resolve the Barretts' appeal as follows. The Barretts contend that the district court entered default judgment against them pursuant to District Court Rules of Civil Procedure (DCRCP) Rule 55. The record reflects, however, that the district court entered the May 17, 2022 Judgment for Possession against the Barretts because Cash-Kaeo demonstrated she was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law under DCRCP Rule 56. Pursuant to DCRCP Rule 56(c), a motion for summary judgment may be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 2  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. Kanahele v. State, 154 Hawaiʻi 190, 201, 549 P.3d 275, 286 (2024). The Barretts point to no evidence in the record indicating a genuine issue of material fact disputing that Cash- Kaeo is the sole surviving lessee of the subject property, and that Cash-Kaeo is therefore entitled to judgment of possession against the Barretts as a matter of law. The Barretts also cite no authority indicating the district court was required to address their counsel's non-appearance at the MSJ hearing before it could grant the MSJ. Even if the district court was required to do so, the Barretts fail to identify any legal theory or issue of fact that could have or would have been presented in opposition to the MSJ to defeat the motion. We therefore conclude the district court did not err in granting the MSJ, and affirm the May 17, 2022 Judgment for Possession. DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, June 20, 2025. On the briefs: /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka Presiding Judge Barry L. Sooalo, for Defendants-Appellants. /s/ Karen T. Nakasone Associate Judge Jay T. Suemori, for Plaintiff-Appellee. /s/ Kimberly T. Guidry Associate Judge

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX 18-JUN-2025 07:58 AM Dkt. 65 SO NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLESTON MAHOE, Defendant-Appellant (CASE NO. 1CPC-XX-XXXXXXX) AND STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLESTON MAHOE, SR., Defendant-Appellant (CASE NO. 1CPC-XX-XXXXXXX) APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER (By: Leonard, Acting C.J., and Hiraoka and Wadsworth, JJ.) Defendant-Appellant Charleston Mahoe, also known as Charleston Mahoe, Sr. (Mahoe), appeals from the following orders (together, the Denial Orders) entered by the Circuit Court of the First Circuit: (1) the February 28, 2023 "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying [Mahoe's] Motion to Dismiss Proceedings" in case no. 1CPC-XX-XXXXXXX (Case 823); and (2) the February 28, 2023 "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying [Mahoe's] Motion to Dismiss Proceedings," in case no. 1CPC-XX-XXXXXXX (Case 829).1/ On June 22, 2017, Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawai#i (State) charged Mahoe in Case 823 with Count 1, Assault in the Second Degree, and Count 2, Violation of a Temporary Restraining Order. On June 23, 2017, the State charged Mahoe in the 829 Case 1/ The Honorable Shirley M. Kawamura presided in both cases.  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER with Counts 1 through 3, Terroristic Threatening in the First Degree, and Counts 4 through 9, Violation of a Temporary Restraining Order. Mahoe pleaded no contest to all counts in both cases, and on December 19, 2017, the circuit court sentenced him to HOPE probation. On June 24, 2022, the State moved in both cases to revoke Mahoe's probation and resentence him. On December 22, 2022, Mahoe filed a Motion to Dismiss Proceedings (Motion to Dismiss) in each case. Mahoe argued that the Hawai#i Supreme Court's decision in State v. Obrero, 151 Hawai#i 472, 517 P.3d 755 (2022), required dismissal due to the State's failure to comply with HRS § 801-1's indictment-or- information requirement. On February 28, 2023, the circuit court entered the Denial Orders, which denied the respective Motions to Dismiss. On May, 11, 2023, the circuit court filed Orders of Resentencing Revocation of Probation. On appeal, Mahoe contends that the circuit court erred in applying "the Motta/Wells standard" to his "Obrero claim" and denying his Motions to Dismiss on that basis. After reviewing the record on appeal and the relevant legal authorities, and giving due consideration to the issues raised and the arguments advanced by the parties, we resolve Mahoe's appeal as follows: The Hawaii Supreme Court has held that "Obrero applies to cases that were pending trial before the decision. Obrero does not apply retroactively to defendants who pled out or to defendants convicted after a trial." State v. Bautista, 153 Hawai#i 284, 289, 535 P.3d 1029, 1034 (2023). The supreme court further held that "defendants awaiting sentencing . . . are foreclosed from having their pleas nullified or their trial convictions overturned" pursuant to Obrero. Id. Here, Mahoe pled out, was convicted, and was sentenced to probation with special conditions before Obrero was decided. He was awaiting resentencing when he first raised his argument based on Obrero. Pursuant to Bautista, Obrero did not apply to 2  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER his cases. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in denying the Motions to Dismiss. Therefore, the respective February 28, 2023 Denial Orders entered by the Circuit Court of the First Circuit in Case 823 and Case 829 are affirmed. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, June 18, 2025. On the briefs: /s/ Katherine G. Leonard Taryn R. Tomasa, Acting Chief Judge Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant. /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka Brian Vincent, Associate Judge Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, City and County of Honolulu, for Plaintiff-Appellee. /s/ Cly

RENDERED: JUNE 20, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-1311-MR KHALIL COLEMAN APPELLANT APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE ACTION NO. 23-CI-00759 KENTUCKY GENERAL ASSEMBLY APPELLEE OPINION AFFIRMING ** ** ** ** ** BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND A. JONES, JUDGES. ACREE, JUDGE: Appellant Khalil Coleman appeals from the Franklin Circuit Court’s order dismissing his complaint against Appellee, the Kentucky General Assembly. Finding no error, we affirm. BACKGROUND Khalil Coleman, a state inmate, filed a pro se lawsuit seeking a declaration regarding certain sections of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. He named the General Assembly of Kentucky as the sole defendant. The General Assembly moved to dismiss the action, arguing Coleman failed to state a claim, and alternatively, if Coleman had stated a claim, the General Assembly is shielded by legislative immunity under Section 43 of the Kentucky Constitution. The Franklin Circuit Court granted the General Assembly’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and declined to assess the immunity defense. Coleman now appeals. ANALYSIS We review de novo a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Davenport Extreme Pools and Spas, Inc. v. Mulflur, 698 S.W.3d 140, 150 (Ky. App. 2024). Trial courts must construe pleadings “in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Gall v. Scroggy, 725 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Ky. App. 1987) (citing Ewell v. Central City, 340 S.W.2d 479 (Ky. 1960)). In response to a pleading, a party to an action may present the defense of a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted by a pre-answer motion. CR1 12.02(f). The General Assembly presented that defense, arguing Coleman’s complaint “does not state any cognizable legal theory related to the General Assembly and alleges no sufficient facts to support one. In fact, the Complaint 1 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. -2- does not even allege any action or inaction by the General Assembly as a body or by its individual members.” (Record (R.) at 55.) Coleman argues his “declaration of rights petition did in fact state several claims, which should have rendered right to relief.” (Appellant’s Brief at 4.) However, even on appeal, Coleman fails to state any claims against the General Assembly. As he did before the Franklin Circuit Court, he again argues that certain statutes are unconstitutional but does not aver in his brief before this Court sufficient facts that would allow the General Assembly to respond with a rational, cogent answer. He asserts no specific wrongdoing by the General Assembly. Rather, he requests that this Court “evoke legislative intent [and] redact statute [sic] of controversy affecting [his] rights.” (Appellant’s Br. at 6.) Although the General Assembly did not submit an Appellee’s Brief, we take that non- response as an expression of its belief there is nothing warranting a response on appeal. While we respect Coleman’s activism, bringing an action against the General Assembly is not a means by which such change can be effectuated. Existence of an actual controversy is a fundamental component of an action. “The court will not decide speculative rights or duties which may or may not arise in the future, but only rights and duties about which there is a present actual controversy presented by adversary parties, and in which a binding judgment concluding the -3- controversy may be entered.” Foley v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.3d 28, 31 (Ky. 2010) (quoting Veith v. City of Louisville, 355 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Ky. 1962)). “An actual controversy . . . does not involve a question which is merely hypothetical or an answer which is no more than an advisory opinion.” Barrett v. Reynolds, 817 S.W.2d 439, 441 (Ky. 1991). Coleman’s request that the Court redact certain statutes is not an actual controversy. Neither is his request that the Court actually issue an advisory opinion, which we are prohibited from rendering. Nordike v. Nordike, 231 S.W.3d 733, 739 (Ky. 2007) (citations omitted) (“It is a fundamental tenet of Kentucky jurisprudence that courts cannot decide matters that have not yet ripened into concrete disputes. Courts are not permitted to render advisory opin

No. 558 June 25, 2025 403 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JONATHAN CORY ANDREWS, Defendant-Appellant. Yamhill County Circuit Court 22CR50352; A185366 Cynthia L. Easterday, Judge. On appellant’s petition for reconsideration of Appellate Commissioner’s order of dismissal filed October 22, 2024. Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Rond Chananudech, Deputy Public Defender, for petition. Before Egan, Presiding Judge, Lagesen, Chief Judge, and Joyce, Judge. LAGESEN, C. J. Reconsideration allowed; order of dismissal adhered to. 404 State v. Andrews LAGESEN, C. J. This is a criminal case in which defendant filed an untimely notice of appeal. When alerted to that fact by a show cause order, defendant filed an untimely motion for late appeal under ORS 138.071(5). The court, by order of the Appellate Commissioner, dismissed the appeal as untimely. Defendant has petitioned for reconsideration, arguing that this appeal should proceed, notwithstanding its double untimeliness problem. The Appellate Commissioner referred the petition for reconsideration to the Motions Department for the purpose of resolving the matter by way of prec- edential opinion. We allow reconsideration for that pur- pose. On reconsideration, we conclude, as did the Appellate Commissioner, that defendant’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal or a timely motion for late appeal means that this appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Both ORS 19.270, made applicable to criminal pro- ceedings by ORS 138.015, and ORS 138.071 generally require, among other things, that a notice of appeal be timely filed for the Court of Appeals to have jurisdiction over an appeal. ORS 19.270 (1), (2)(b). The legislature has, however, carved out an exception to that requirement in ORS 138.071(5). That statute directs that “the Court of Appeals shall grant the defendant leave to file a notice of appeal after the time limits” set forth in those statutes provided the defendant (1) files a motion that makes the showing described in ORS 138.071(5)(a) and (2) files the motion “no later than 90 days after the party receives notice that the order or judgment has been entered.” ORS 138.071(5)(c); State v. Smith, 330 Or App 397, 399, 543 P3d 1258 (2024) (describing process for filing motion for late appeal). In this case, it is undisputed that defendant neither filed a timely notice of appeal, nor filed a timely motion for late appeal. Defendant nevertheless argues that his untimely-filed notice of appeal is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on this court because it was filed within the time for filing a motion for late appeal, albeit without the motion required by ORS 138.071(5). In support of that argument, he points to our deci- sion in Smith. There, we concluded that the defendant’s fail- ure to include a proposed notice of appeal, as required by ORS Cite as 341 Or App 403 (2025) 405 138.071(5)(c), with the defendant’s timely-filed motion for late appeal did not deprive the court of jurisdiction to grant the timely-filed motion for late appeal. Smith, 330 Or App at 399. Defendant invites us to read Smith to stand for the following: “In short, so long as the defendant files something noti- fying the court and the state of the defendant’s intent to appeal within 90-days, the failure to comply with the many requirements for notices of appeal, including the failure to file an accompanying motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal, can be cured by timelines set by the court.” We reject that invitation for two reasons. First, it is detached from the procedure set forth by the plain terms of ORS 138.071(5). Were we to adopt defen- dant’s proposed approach, we would effectively be rewriting ORS 138.071(5) to craft a process entirely different from the one enacted by the legislature. Rewriting statutes is not part of the judicial function. Bellshaw v. Farmers Ins. Co., 373 Or 307, 326-27, 567 P3d 434 (2025). Second, defendant’s proposed approach is at odds with longstanding Oregon law treating the timelines for filing appeals as jurisdictional. In addressing whether the defect in Smith was a jurisdictional one, we looked, in part, to case law addressing what appeal-filing defects were jurisdictional and what defects were merely technical. Smith, 330 Or App at 403-04 (discussing Pohrman v. Klamath Co. Comm., 272 Or 390, 538 P2d 70 (1975)). That case law indicated that the key jurisdictional requirements were the timely filing and service of the notice of appeal, something that, in Smith, supported