Citizens Insurance Company of America v. Mullins Food Products, Inc.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 9 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT NATIONWIDE LEGAL, LLC, No. 24-3059 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:23-cv-00599-MEMF-MRW v. MEMORANDUM* JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., a Nationally Chartered Bank, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Maame Ewusi-Mensah Frimpong, District Judge, Presiding Submitted May 12, 2025** Pasadena, California Before: IKUTA, R. NELSON, and LEE, Circuit Judges. Nationwide Legal, LLC appeals the district court’s order dismissing its negligence claim against JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. Nationwide sued Chase after one of Nationwide’s employees stole company funds by changing the payee on * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). company checks and depositing the checks into personal checking accounts at Chase. Nationwide alleges that Chase acted negligently when it permitted Nationwide’s employee to deposit the checks.1 The district court dismissed Nationwide’s claim against Chase after finding that it was barred by the one-year statute of limitations under Section 340(c) of the California Code of Civil Procedure. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review de novo a district court’s dismissal based on statutes of limitations. Williamson v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 208 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm. California state law governs this diversity action, and the California Supreme Court “is the final arbiter of what is state law.” West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236 (1940). We “follow a published intermediate state court decision . . . unless we are convinced that the California Supreme Court would reject it.” Muniz v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 738 F.3d 214, 219 (9th Cir. 2013). 1. The plain language of Section 340(c) covers Nationwide’s claim. In California, an action “by a depositor against a bank for payment of a forged or raised check” must be filed within one year. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340(c). First, the 1 The district court also dismissed Nationwide’s other two claims against Chase: (1) violation of Section 4401 of the California Commercial Code and (2) breach of contract. Nationwide did not address either of those claims in its opening brief, so we conclude that Nationwide forfeited any arguments regarding those claims. See Ind. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003). 2 24-3059 district court correctly found that the checks at issue in this case were “forged” such that Section 340(c) may apply, see Union Tool Co. v. Farmers’ & Merchs.’ Nat’l Bank of Los Angeles, 218 P. 424, 429 (Cal. 1923), and Nationwide does not challenge that finding on appeal. Second, Nationwide’s claim is an action “by a depositor against a bank.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340(c). We must give the statutory language its “plain and commonsense meaning.” Smith v. LoanMe, Inc., 483 P.3d 869, 872 (Cal. 2021). The plain language of Section 340(c) covers an action brought by a depositor against the bank where the depositor deposits its funds. Nationwide is a depositor with Chase, so Section 340(c) applies to its claim against Chase for “payment of a forged or raised check.” Nationwide points us to a footnote in Roy Supply, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank that states Section 340(c) “applies only to an action by a depositor against a payor bank.” 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 309, 321 n.20 (Ct. App. 1995). Here, Nationwide does not allege that Chase acted negligently in its role as “payor” bank by paying the forged checks. Rather, Nationwide claims Chase negligently accepted the checks from the employee for deposit as the “depositary” bank. But the footnote in Roy Supply stating that Section 340(c) applies only in actions against payor banks is dicta, see 46 Cal. Rptr. at 323 n.25 (explaining that “the statute of limitations issue was not resolved in the trial court and is not at issue 3 24-3059 in this appeal”), and a different lower court

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 9 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MATTHEW BECKER; LAUREN No. 24-443 KUEHNE; ADAM CRISWELL; D.C. No. KRYSTAL CRISWELL; ALFEE DIXON; 3:21-cv-05185-JHC DONALD FINISTER Sr.; CHRISTOPHER HART; JASON KOVACK; RICKY LORENSIUS; HEATHER MAREK; MEMORANDUM* MICHAEL MARTIN; DAISEY MARTINEAR; GRACE MATEIAK; IAN MATEIAK; JOHN MELOPRIETO; TRAVIS NEUMAN; Doctor ARIEL NEUMAN; MICHELLE PAULINO; JOHN PAULINO; JAMES RAMPONI; LINDSEY RAMPONI; ERIC MCCANDLESS; PAIGE ROE; PAUL ROHRER; ANDREW SICAT; NICOYA SICAT; IAN LAUGHLIN; SHELLY LAUGHLIN; TAMMARA BOYLES; BOBBY BOYLES; LAIN SUPE; PETER BROWN; JEREMY SIERRA; ERICA SIERRA; DARIUS USMAN; KRISTEN ZABAGLO; DAVID WILSON, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. TIG INSURANCE COMPANY; UNITED SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign insurer, * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.  Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington John H. Chun, District Judge, Presiding Submitted June 5, 2025** Seattle, Washington Before: HAWKINS, GOULD, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges. Appellants (“Homeowners”) appeal the dismissal of their case with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 41(b) and several interlocutory rulings. We affirm the dismissal and do not consider Homeowners’ other claims because the dismissal was proper, foreclosing review of interlocutory rulings. A dismissal under Rule 41(b) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Al- Torki v. Kaempen, 78 F.3d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir.1996). “The trial court's dismissal will only be disturbed if there is a definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 640-41 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). This court weighs five factors to decide whether dismissal for failure to ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 2 24-443 prosecute or comply with a court order is proper. Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir. 1998). They are: “(1) the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” Id. There must be “unreasonable delay” before dismissal is proper. In re Eisen, 31 F.3d 1447, 1451 (9th Cir.1994). “A reviewing court will give deference to the district court to decide what is unreasonable because it is in the best position to determine what period of delay can be endured before its docket becomes unmanageable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Homeowners’ action. The district judge made detailed findings regarding each factor. Because the facts are familiar to the parties, we reference them only as they are relevant to the decision. The first factor—the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation— strongly favored dismissal. Homeowners exhibited a pattern of noncompliance with deadlines. Failure to comply with the court’s orders or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides grounds for dismissal under Rule 41(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Homeowners argue that they missed these deadlines in good faith, but a showing of bad faith is not required under the court’s inherent power to dismiss for lack of 3 24-443 prosecution under Rule 41(b). See Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1425 (9th Cir. 1986). The second factor—the district court’s need to manage its docket—also strongly favored dismissal. Plaintiffs’ repeated failures to meet deadlines undermined efficient management of the district court’s docket. See Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642. The third factor—the risk of prejudice to Appellee TIG Insurance Company (“TIG”)—also strongly favored dismissal. TIG suffered prejudice because Homeowners interfered with

USCA4 Appeal: 23-1061 Doc: 21 Filed: 06/27/2025 Pg: 1 of 2 UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 23-1061 GREGORY DALZELL, JR., Plaintiff - Appellant, v. ARLINGTON COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE; BETH ARTHUR, Sheriff, in her individual and official capacity, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Anthony John Trenga, Senior District Judge. (1:22-cv-00407-AJT-JFA) Submitted: January 29, 2025 Decided: June 27, 2025 Before NIEMEYER, HEYTENS, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. ON BRIEF: James B. Thorsen, Jesse A. Roche, THORSENALLEN, LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Alexander Francuzenko, Philip C. Krone, COOK CRAIG & FRANCUZENKO, PLLC, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-1061 Doc: 21 Filed: 06/27/2025 Pg: 2 of 2 PER CURIAM: Gregory Dalzell, Jr., appeals the district court’s order granting Defendant Sheriff Beth Arthur summary judgment in Dalzell’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. Dalzell v. Arlington Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., No. 1:22-cv-00407-AJT-JFA (E.D. Va. Dec. 19, 2022). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 2

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 25a0150p.06 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ┐ JASON COUNTS; DONALD KLEIN; OSCAR ZAMORA; │ JASON SILVEUS; JOHN MISKELLY; THOMAS HAYDUK; │ JOSHUA RODRIGUEZ; BASSAM HIRMIZ; CHRISTOPHER │ HEMBERGER; DEREK LONG, individually and on behalf > No. 24-1139 of themselves and all others similarly situated, │ Plaintiffs-Appellants, │ │ │ v. │ │ GENERAL MOTORS, LLC; ROBERT BOSCH LLC, │ Defendants-Appellees. │ ┘ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Bay City. No. 1:16-cv-12541—Thomas L. Ludington, District Judge. Argued: March 18, 2025 Decided and Filed: June 6, 2025 Before: GRIFFIN, KETHLEDGE, and BUSH, Circuit Judges. _________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: Garth Wojtanowicz, HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO, LLP, Seattle, Washington, for Appellants. Jay P. Lefkowitz, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, New York, New York, for Appellee General Motors. Patrick Swiber, CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, STEEN & HAMILTON, LLP, New York, New York, for Appellee Robert Bosch LLC. ON BRIEF: Garth Wojtanowicz, Steve W. Berman, HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO, LLP, Seattle, Washington, Christopher A. Seeger, SEEGER WEISS LLP, Ridgefield Park, New Jersey, Shauna B. Itri, SEEGER WEISS LLP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, James E. Cecchi, James A. O’Brien III, CARELLA, BRYNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C., Roseland, New Jersey, for Appellants. Jay P. Lefkowitz, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, New York, New York, Renee D. Smith, Jeffrey S. Bramson, Cole T. Carter, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellee General Motors. Abena A. Mainoo, Carmine D. Boccuzzi Jr., CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, STEEN & HAMILTON, LLP, New York, New York, Matthew D.  No. 24-1139 Counts, et al. v. General Motors, LLC, et al. Page 2 Slater, CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON LLP, Washington, D.C., William R. Jansen, Jonathan E. Lauderbach, WARNER NORCROSS & JUDD LLP, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee Robert Bosch LLC. Jonathan S. Martel, ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP, San Francisco, California, for Amici Curiae. _________________ OPINION _________________ KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. The plaintiffs appeal the district court’s judgment in favor of the defendants as to their claims that GM and Bosch misled consumers regarding the emissions generated by certain Chevrolet Cruze vehicles. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. A. New motor vehicles generally cannot be sold in the United States without a “certificate of conformity,” which is the EPA’s certification that a vehicle complies with all federal emissions standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7522(a)(1), 7525(a); 40 C.F.R. § 86.1854-12(a)(1). As part of the certification process, manufacturers must disclose whether a vehicle has any “auxiliary emission control devices” (AECDs), which for various reasons can increase vehicle emissions under certain operating circumstances. See 42 U.S.C. § 7525; 40 C.F.R. §§ 86.127-12, 86.1844- 01(d)(11). AECDs use software to sense conditions like temperature, speed, or engine RPMs “for the purpose of activating, modulating, delaying, or deactivating the operation of any part of the emission control system.” 40 C.F.R. § 86.082-2. A manufacturer’s disclosures must provide “a detailed justification of each AECD that results in a reduction in the effectiveness of the emission control system, and rationale for why it is not a defeat device.” 40 C.F.R. § 86.1844- 01(d)(11). A “defeat device,” in turn, is an AECD that unjustifiably “reduces the effectiveness of the emission control system under conditions which may reasonably be expect